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Not All Carried Interests Are Created
Equal
Adam H. Rosenzweig °
Abstract: Recently, a significant debate over the taxation of so-called "carried
interest" in private equity funds has received much attention from scholars, the
government, commentators, and the media. This debate has focused on whether
private equity fund managers who earn a percentage of the returns generated by
the fund should be entitled to preferential "capital gain" treatment on such
returns. The primary concern in this debate revolves around whether managers
are effectively being compensated for services normally taxed at higher rates
while receiving the benefit of preferential rates reserved for capital gains.
Proponents of reform point to the services being performed by the managers,
while proponents of the current system point to the investment exposure to the
underlying assets of the fund. In reality, however, both sides are partially
correct: carried interest is "blended" in that it represents both a return to
services and a return on capital. Since carried interest is blended in this
manner, an analogy to either proves less than satisfying.
The issue of blended labor/investment returns is not new to the tax laws,
however. Historically, one way the law has attempted to address the issue was
not by deconstructing such returns into constituent parts, but instead by
imposing a "holding period" requirement. Under this approach, not all capital
investments are created equal; rather, only capital investments held for an
arbitrary period of time while bearing the risk of loss qualify for preferential
rates. The current debate over the taxation of carried interest in private equity
has failed to incorporate this element into the analysis, i.e., the role that holding
period plays in denying preferential rates to blended labor/investment returns,
such as carried interest. This Article will do so, concluding that, to the extent
any reform of the taxation of carried interest within the existing framework of
the income tax is appropriate, a better approach may be through the application
of the holding period rules rather than through current proposals to either
change the definition of capital gains or further complicate the partnership tax
rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a significant debate over the taxation of so-called "carried
interest" in private equity funds has received much attention from scholars,
the government, commentators, and the media-both within and without
the United States.' This debate has focused on the treatment of carried
interest as capital gain for the managers of private equity funds. In
particular, it has focused on whether private equity fund managers who earn
a percentage (typically twenty percent) of the gains generated by the
investments held by the fund should be entitled to capital gain treatment
(entitled to preferential tax rates) rather than ordinary income treatment on
such largesse. The debate has generally been comprised of two separate but
related points: (1) whether carried interest is properly analogized to "sweat
equity"--that is, return on entrepreneurial effort-or salary (in this case,
compensation for money management),2 and (2) if so, whether the tax rules
applicable to partnerships are the proper fora for addressing this issue.3
Often overlooked in this debate is that the tax treatment of managers of
different types of private investment funds, including not only private
the Symposium. Any errors are solely those of the author.
1 See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX
TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS 6 (2007) [hereinafter JCT CARRIED
INTEREST REPORT]; Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009); Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest
Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REv. 121; Victor Fleischer, Two and
Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Matthew A. Melone, Success Breeds Discontent: Reforming the Taxation of Carried
Interests: Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 46 DuQ. L. REv. 421 (2008); Philip F.
Postlewaite, Fifteen and Thirty Five: Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue
Code: The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a Proprietary Interest in a
Business Enterprise, 28 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2009); David A. Weisbach, The
Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008); New Worries
About Private Equity, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2007, at 63; Robert Peston, Tax and Private
Equity, BBC, June 15, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.ukiblogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2007/06
/tax andprivate.equity.html ("in the UK, MPs... are sending out a strong signal that they
want private equity firms' 'carry'-their share of the capital gains made on the investments
made by their funds-taxed at a higher rate than the prevailing 10%."); Howard E. Abrams,
Carried Interests: The Past Is Prologue (Emory U, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No.
08-32), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1085582.
2 Sweat equity is often thought of in terms of small business owners whose work effort
increases the value of the business, which can then be sold for capital gain. Chris William
Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest: The Problematic Analogy to "Sweat Equity," 117 TAX
NOTES 239, 240-42 (2007).
3 See Postlewaite, supra note 1; Abrams, supra note 1, at 1; see also Howard E. Abrams,
Taxation of Carried Interests, 116 TAX NOTES 183 (2007). In addition, another related but
distinct issue recently discussed in the literature has been the "conversion" of management
fees into carried interest. See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee
Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743 (2009).
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equity funds but also venture capital and hedge funds, is not necessarily the
same. The debate has tended to group these funds together, mostly because
the managers of each tend to charge some form of percentage fee based on
the performance of the fund (the so-called "two and twenty").4 Each is
significantly different, however, not only in its business model but also in
its tax treatment. Most notably, the tax treatment of the equivalent of
carried interest in most hedge funds raises little of the same preferential rate
concerns that plague carried interests in private equity funds, precisely
because even under current law the profits paid to hedge fund managers are
generally not entitled to preferential rates.
The question that follows is: if the concern is over preferential rates for
carried interest, why is there such a problem with the taxation of carried
interest for private equity but not for other private funds? This Article
contends that the answer lies in the failure of the carried interest debate to
incorporate a crucial element into the analysis, i.e., the role that the holding
period plays in denying preferential tax rates to blended labor/investment
returns such as carried interest. The primary concern over the taxation of
carried interest is that managers are effectively being compensated for their
services but are receiving the benefit of the preferential rates applied to
long-term capital gains. On the other hand, managers do have some
investment exposure to the underlying capital asset. Thus, since carried
interest is "blended"-it has some components of ordinary income and
some components of capital gain-an analogy to either situation proves less
than satisfying.
The issue of blended labor/investment returns is not new to the tax
laws, however. Historically, one way the law has attempted to address the
issue was not by deconstructing such returns into constituent parts, but by
imposing a "holding period" requirement.5 Under this approach, not all
investments are created equal; rather, only capital investments held for an
arbitrary period of time while bearing the risk of loss qualify for preferential
rates. It is precisely these rules that prevent managers of certain private
funds, such as hedge funds, from obtaining the benefit of preferential
capital gains tax rates for their carried interest in most instances. In other
words, not all carried interests are created equal.
This Article will incorporate the holding period analysis into the
carried interest debate, concluding that, to the extent any reform of the
taxation of carried interest is appropriate (absent complete overhaul of the
taxation of partnerships, repeal of the capital gains preference, or other
fundamental change to the tax laws), the proper approach may well be
4 Recent work has begun to emphasize these differences in other contexts, however. See
Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in Private Equity and
Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 27 (2008).
5 See infra Section IV.
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through the holding period rules rather than current proposals to either
change the definition of capital gains or further complicate the partnership
tax accounting rules. Not only would this more closely conform with the
historical approach to blended returns and capital gains, and more closely fit
within the existing tax regime, but it could also be less problematic than
other current proposals with respect to incentives for private equity funds
(or their managers) to move offshore to escape U.S. taxation altogether. As
a result, the holding period approach could bridge the divide between two
sides of a debate which have often talked past each other: reformers who
want to impose higher rates on carried interest and those who note reform
could cause more harm than good under the current structure of the income
tax.
Section II of this Article will briefly summarize the structure of private
equity and hedge funds and compare and contrast the carried interest in
private equity and incentive fees in hedge funds so as to frame the role
holding period plays. Section III will then summarize the current debate
over carried interest, and discuss how current law applies to hedge funds to
deny preferential rates. Section IV will analyze the policy behind the
holding period requirement for long-term capital gains and explain why, as
a normative matter, carried interest could be treated as short-term capital
gain within this framework, both from a domestic and international
standpoint. Section V will then discuss why, as a positive matter, the
holding period approach would be an easier, more administrable means to
address the concern over the taxation of carried interest under current law
than other proposals.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY AND HEDGE FUNDS
Much has been written on carried interest and the structure and
business model of private equity funds. This Article will not attempt to
recreate such discussions in detail, but rather will briefly describe the
structure of private equity funds for the purposes of comparing and
contrasting them with hedge funds, thus framing the role that holding
period plays in denying preferential rates to blended returns.
Both private equity and hedge funds are forms of private investment
funds, or pools of money brought together in a non-regulated entity to make
investments on behalf of the investors. All private investment funds share
certain fundamental similarities: they raise money privately rather than
through the public capital markets, the money is pooled and invested by
managers who attempt to earn returns in excess of the market as a whole,
and the managers charge a fee equal to a percentage of the gains generated
on the investments. 6 Beyond these similarities, however, different types of
6 See JCT CARRIED INTEREST REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-36.
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private investment funds can differ significantly from an economic,
business model, and tax perspective.
Private equity funds are generally those funds for which the business
model is to use leverage to acquire controlling interests in portfolio
companies, and to increase their value for the purpose of a future sale.7 The
increase in value may result from several reasons, including a more efficient
capital structure, a more efficient management team, a better compensation
structure, or simply through operating synergies or other more traditional
strategic business models. Regardless, the intent of the private equity fund
is to acquire control of a portfolio company, increase its value, and then
monetize the investment within a relatively short time-frame, typically one
to five years from the time of acquisition. 8
Hedge funds, on the other hand, are less well-defined. Hedge funds
are often referred to as lightly regulated pools of investment capital. 9 This
definition misses the crucial defining characteristic of hedge funds,
however: hedge funds are those private investment funds which seek to
exploit small arbitrage or mispricing opportunities in the market, and to
profit from them through the use of leverage.' 0 Thus, rather than acquire
controlling interests in companies, hedge funds engage in numerous
investment activities such as trading of securities and derivatives, betting on
the arbitrage of a proposed merger, providing liquidity to capital markets, or
exploiting unperceived market arbitrages. 1 Regardless of the particular
business model, hedge funds do not, as a general matter, profit from
acquiring controlling interests in companies with the intent to create excess
returns through implementing changes in the particular company. 12 As a
result, hedge funds rarely hold investments for more than a short period of
time or with any significant exposure to long-term price fluctuations.
' Id. at 34.
8 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8-9.
9 See, e.g., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
(1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf; INT'L
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND
ISSUES (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT]; SEC STAFF REP.,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
10 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 726. See generally Ren6 M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past,
Present and Future, 19 (Fisher C. Bus. Working Paper Series, No. 2007-03-003, 2007),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=939629 ("The skill of a hedge fund manager is
required to produce alpha returns, but not to take beta risk.").
" See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds. A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus.
L.J. 323, 366-70 (2007) (discussing investment policies and objectives of, and use of
leverage by, hedge funds).
12 See Weisbach, supra note 1, at 726; Andrew W. Needham & Christian Brause, Hedge
Funds, 736 TAx MGMT., A-I, A-7 (2007).
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The typical private equity fund is formed as a limited partnership.' 3
The limited partnership issues limited partner interests to capital investors
and the general partnership interest to an affiliate of the management team
(the GP).14  The management team operates through a management
company which typically does not own any interest in the partnership, but
does enter into an agreement with the partnership to provide management
services in exchange for a fee (often two percent of the committed capital
annually).' 5  This fee paid to the management company is ordinary fee
income and is generally used to pay administrative salaries, overhead, and
other costs of operating the fund. 6
The GP is an affiliate of the management company and invests some
amount of capital in the partnership, typically one percent of the total
committed capital, and also receives the right to share in a percentage,
typically twenty percent, of the profits of the fund, if any.' 7 This interest,
usually referred to as the "carried interest," represents a right to share in
future profits.18  If the partnership were liquidated before making any
investments, the carried interest would only be entitled to the initial
invested capital as a distribution of assets and would receive nothing with
respect to the profits interest.' 
9
The carried interest of a private equity fund is structured so as to share
in the total profits over the lifetime of the fund (limited to a fixed period,
e.g., ten years).20 The fund will typically make multiple investments in
portfolio companies over the life of the fund, and will monetize a number of
them well before the end of the life of the fund.2' The income from these
investments is divided among the partners of the fund as if it represented
the total income from the fund.22 Thus, upon the sale of the first portfolio
company, a GP may be entitled to twenty percent of the gain even if the
fund may lose money on future investments. As a result, certain private
13 JCT CARRIED INTEREST REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8.
14 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8. The GP tends to be a partnership for tax purposes,
ultimately owned by taxable individuals eligible for preferential capital gains rates. For
purposes of simplicity, this Article will refer collectively to the "GP" to encompass both the
entity and its owners.
15 Id.
16 See Postlewaite, supra note 1 (manuscript at 33).
17 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8.
18 Id.
19 See Postlewaite, supra note 1 (manuscript at 35).
20 See Mark P. Gergen, A Pragmatic Case for Taxing an Equity Fund Manager's Profit
Share as Compensation, 87 TAxEs 139, 142 (2009).
21 See Paul H. Asofsky, US. Private Equity Funds: Common Tax Issues for Investors and
Other Participants, 630 PLI/TAX 1275, 1295-96 (2008) (referring to this as the "realized
investment" model).
22 Id.
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equity funds provide for a "clawback"-or the obligation of the GP to repay
the fund for any excess carried interest it withdrew from the fund in earlier
years. 23 In turn, the limited partners (LPs) are often subject to a "lockup"-
requiring them to stay invested in the fund for the life of the fund. 4
For this reason, most private equity fund GPs do not take distributions
of carried interest on a current basis. Rather, cash must first be distributed
to the LPs such that their capital is returned (and at times, a preferred return
on capital is paid as well), and only then may the GPs receive
distributions.25 The one general exception is that the GP is permitted to
withdraw cash advances against the carried interest from the fund to pay
their personal taxes attributable to the carried interest. 26 These withdrawals
are subject to the clawback, which makes the clawback meaningful even
though the GP generally does not withdraw cash with respect to the carried
interest before the LPs are paid.27
Carried interest in a private equity fund is economically similar to the
LPs of the fund lending money to the GP on a nonrecourse basis to acquire
a capital interest in the partnership. 28 That is, if the fund makes money on
its portfolio investments, the GP shares in the profits only after "repaying"
the loan to the LPs; in other words, the GP only receives money if the
portfolio companies appreciate in excess of the LPs' initial cost (plus a
preferred return on capital in some cases). If the portfolio investments
decline in value, the GP does not receive any distribution on the carried
interest but at the same time does not owe anything to the LPs.
For example, assume a simplified private equity fund with one LP and
one GP. The GP contributes one million dollars to the fund and the LP
contributes ninety nine million dollars to the fund. The fund then acquires
all of the stock of two different corporations as separate investments, each
for fifty million dollars. The fund agreement provides that all proceeds will
first be paid to the LP until it receives its ninety nine million dollars, and
then paid to the GP until it receives its one million dollars, and then divided
eighty percent to the LP and twenty percent to the GP. In year three, the
first investment increases in value from fifty million to one hundred and
fifty million dollars and the fund sells it for cash. First, the LP receives
ninety nine million dollars, then the GP receives one million dollars, after
23 JCT CARRIED INTEREST REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Weisbach, supra note 1, at 723.
24 Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-7 ("After the initial capital commitment, an
investor in a private equity fund assumes a passive role during the remaining life of the fund,
waiting until the fund calls capital or sells an investment.").
25 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 722-23.
26 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1.
27 Id.
28 Cunningham & Engler, supra note 1, at 126-27; Fleischer, supra note 1, at 40;
Weisbach, supra note 1, at 734 ("The closest analogy to a profits interest is a taxpayer who
takes out a nonrecourse loan.").
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which the GP receives ten million dollars and the LP receives forty million
dollars of the remaining fifty million dollars. In year four, the second
investment becomes worthless and the fund sells it for nothing. Over the
life of the fund, the total profits were fifty million dollars-twenty percent
of which is ten million dollars. Even after paying the carried interest, the
LP received a return of slightly higher than forty percent on the initial
capital investment, which is significantly better than most investment-based
returns. The GP, on the other hand, earned a staggering return of one
thousand percent on its invested capital.
Hedge funds operate in a fundamentally different manner. Since they
tend to trade regularly and invest in numerous different investments, the
committed capital is rarely locked-up in any significant manner (beyond
perhaps an initial start-up period).29  Rather, investors in a hedge fund
typically have had the right to withdraw their investment, plus their share of
investment returns, at regular intervals (for example, quarterly).3 ° In turn,
the hedge fund manager charges an "incentive fee" against the profits of the
fund. 31 This incentive fee is then paid (in one way or another) to the hedge
fund manager at that time; the payment is complete and not subject to any
clawback or other right to claim a repayment from the investors, even if the
fund loses money in the future.32 Thus, investors in hedge funds own a
much more liquid investment than a private equity LP interest but also are
charged the equivalent of carried interest on an ongoing basis with no right
to reclaim such amounts for future losses.3 3
Hedge funds are typically structured as multiple entities, some
partnerships and some corporations; the capital is then pooled among these34
related entities and used to make the investments of the hedge fund. The
29 See Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-7; see generally Ordower, supra note 11,
at 366-67.
30 In light of the recent financial crisis, however, some hedge funds have taken the
extraordinary measure of limiting withdrawals or redemptions due to liquidity or financial
constraints. See, e.g., Zachary Kouwe, Hedge Fund Lets Investors Withdraw What Is Left,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at B8 ("Several large hedge funds, including Citadel Investment
Group and Farallon Capital Management, have halted investor redemptions in certain funds
after having huge losses last year."); Tom Petruno, Exits Barred at Some Funds: Hedge
Managers' Limits on Withdrawals Amid Market Turbulence Could Hurt Investor
Confidence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at C-i; Louise Story, A Squeeze on Leading Fund
Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at Cl ("On Tuesday, RAB Capital, a British fund
manager reportedly froze redemptions on its fund for three years .... "); Louise Story,
Hedge Funds Are Bracing for Investors to Cash Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at Cl.
31 Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-8.
32 Id. at A-9; Weisbach, supra note 1, at 723 n. 12.
33 Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-7 ("The investor in a hedge fund has more
control over the sales process. It initiates the process by notifying the portfolio manager that
it intends to withdraw from the fund.").
34 Hedge funds use multiple structures to accomplish this, such as "master feeder" and
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manager of the hedge fund charges the incentive fee in one of two ways: (1)
for the partnerships, the manager owns a profits interest similar to a carried
interest and (2) for the corporations, the manager charges a fee for the
investment services of the manager. 35 These incentive fees are charged on
a regular basis based on the value of the assets of the fund at the time of the
calculation.36
Assume the same facts as above, except that the fund is a simplified
version of a hedge fund rather than a private equity fund and the incentive
fee is calculated on an annual basis. In year one, the hedge fund purchases
ten different assets for ten million dollars each. By the end of year two, the
assets as a whole have increased in value to two hundred million dollars.
As a result, the GP charges an incentive fee of twenty million dollars, or
twenty percent of the one hundred million dollar profit, which is paid to the
GP at the end of the year. The next year, the assets decline in value to one
hundred million dollars. Since there is no profit, the GP does not charge an
incentive fee in year three, but also is not required to repay any of the
twenty million dollar incentive fee it received in year two.
37
III. TAXING CARRIED INTEREST: THE DEBATE
Given the significant differences in business model, legal structure,
and economic agreement between the GP and LPs, it makes sense that the
analysis for hedge funds and private equity funds might differ when
"hub and spoke" structures-regardless, the basic premise remains that multiple entities pool
capital to make investments on behalf of the fund. See Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at
A-3-4; Ordower, supra note 11, at 361-64.
35 See Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-8-9.
36 See Ordower, supra note 11, at 347:
Rarely do fund managers return any portion of incentive fees they have collected
previously when assets decline in value following an incentive fee. Rather
managers agree to claim subsequent incentive fees only when the value of the
investor's interest exceeds the incentive fee floor or "high water mark." The floor
is the highest value of that investor's interest upon which the manager previously
collected an incentive fee. This floor computational method prevents the manager
from collecting multiple incentive fees on cyclical increases and decreases in value
in volatile markets. The floor, however, does not preclude retention of fees
attributable to aberrant market spikes since the value of an investor's account is the
investor's share of the net asset value of the fund without regard to whether the
fund has realized any gain by disposing of positions.
37 Under a provision sometimes included in hedge funds often known as the "high water
mark," the manager would not be able to charge an incentive fee again until the assets
appreciate in excess of two hundred million dollars. See Jerald David August & Lawrence
Cohen, Hedge Funds-Structure, Regulation and Tax Implications, 815 PLIfATx 131, 142
(2008).
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considering the tax treatment of carried interest, notwithstanding that both
types of funds use a similar means to compensate GPs as an incentive to
maximize returns. To examine these distinctions in more detail, this
Section will summarize the current debate regarding the taxation of carried
interest. Much has been written about the taxation of carried interest, and
there is little need for a retelling of all the issues in detail, and thus this
Section will only frame the existing debate.
As discussed in Section II, carried interest in private equity funds is
typically issued in the form of a profits interest in the limited partnership.
The GP receives the profits interest as an affiliate of the management
company, which provides the investment services for the fund. Thus, the
sole reason the GP is issued the profits interest is in exchange for the
services. In general, for tax purposes, when a service provider receives
property in exchange for services, the value of the property is treated as
salary, or ordinary income, on the date of issuance.3 8 The treatment of the
receipt of a profits interest in a partnership has been more controversial,
however, with the courts, government, and commentators often reaching
contradictory conclusions.3 In part to resolve this confusion, in 1993 the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) formally announced that, under certain
conditions, it would treat a profits interest as if it had no value at the time of
issuance, with the result that there would be no income to the GP upon the
grant of a carried interest.
40
The position of the IRS with respect to the issuance of profits interests
in exchange for services is based on the theory that the value of a profits
interest is equivalent to the amount of capital allocated to the interest in the
"capital account" of the partnership, or the "liquidation value" of the
interest. 4' Ignoring the minimal contributed capital, since the GP would
receive no distributions if the fund never generated any profits, and is not
entitled to any capital of the partnership at the date of the grant, the profits
interest is deemed to have no value at issuance. This is clearly a legal
fiction; the carried interest must have some economic value to the GP since
the GP accepted it in the first place and could earn substantial amounts in
the future. The fiction is consistent with the general methodology used to
38 26 U.S.C. § 83 (2008).
39 Compare Diamond v. Comm., 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affid 492 F. 2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974)
(ruling that a profits interest was taxable upon receipt) with Campbell v. Comm., 943 F. 2d.
815 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing a Tax Court ruling that receipt of a profits interest was a
taxable event). See also JCT CARRIED INTEREST REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; Weisbach,
supra note 1, at 727 n.22; Leo L. Schmolka, Commentary, Taxing Partnership Interests
Exchanged for Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAx. L. REV. 287 (1991).
40 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; see generally ARTHUR B. WILLIS, JOHN S.
PENNELL & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 4.06[7] (6th ed. 2002).
41 See WILLIS, PENNELL & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 40, 10.05.
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account for partnership income for income tax purposes, however.
Although the rules work such that by the end of the life of a partnership the
items of taxable income and economic income should match, due to this
fiction they do not match at the time of issuance.
The fund is treated like a partnership for tax purposes, meaning the
income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits of the fund "flow through" to
the partners of the fund regardless whether any cash is distributed. The
partners then include such items in their personal tax returns. The fund
utilizes an accounting mechanism of "capital accounts" to keep track of
which partner is entitled to what assets as income, gains, losses, and credits
are generated at the fund level.44 The fund allocates these tax items among
the partners and the tax law generally respects the manner in which the
partnership does so, as long as the allocations have "substantial economic
effect"-effectively, so long as the allocation of the tax items also adjust
capital accounts.45 In this manner, the tax laws are structured so that the
allocation of taxable items corresponds to the economic realities of how the
partners are actually sharing profits and losses.
For tax purposes, as a partner of the fund the GP is allocated a share of
profits from the sale of portfolio companies as they occur. These profits
flow-through to the GP at the time of the sale, and the character of such
income is determined at the partnership level.4 6 Since the profits interest is
considered an interest in the partnership under this approach, the income
attributable to the GP is considered to be a portion of the income of the
partnership. For the most part in private equity funds, the income is
primarily gain from the sale or exchange of stock in portfolio companies.
Thus, assuming the gain from the sale is capital gain for tax purposes, it
flows through to the GP as a partner in the partnership and is reported as
capital gain by the GP. Since the members of the GP ultimately are
individuals, they are generally eligible for preferential rates on capital
gain.47
The controversy that arose was not over the technical application of
these rules, but rather that, through the application of these rules, managers
of private equity funds were effectively being compensated for their
services while receiving income in the form of capital gain for tax
42 The partnership tax accounting mechanism is intended to reflect the partner's current
share of assets of the partnership. This simplifying methodology is assumed solely for tax
purposes to reflect the true economic relationship of the parties. Id.
43 See generally id. 10.01-05.
44 26 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 (2008).
45 See generally WILLIS, PENNELL & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 40, 10.04.
46 26 U.S.C. § 702(b) (2008). For a more detailed discussion, see infra Section IV.
4' 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2008). For a more detailed discussion, see infra Section IV.
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purposes. 48 This can be seen by returning to the example in Section II
above, in which the LP received a return of almost forty percent on its
invested capital while the GP received a return of one thousand percent on
its invested capital. Why did the GP earn such a disproportionately higher
return on its capital than the LP? It would appear that the only way to
explain this disproportionate return for the GP would be that the return was
not really on invested capital but rather compensation to the GP for finding
and managing the investments of the fund. Since other money managers,
such as those at mutual funds and investment banks, do not receive
compensation as capital gain, but rather receive fees or salaries treated as
ordinary income, proponents of changing the taxation of carried interest
claim that this disparate treatment violates the norm of horizontal equity,
which provides that similarly situated taxpayers should bear similar tax
burdens.49
Proponents of maintaining the current law treatment of carried interest
counter that horizontal equity may not be a useful tool in analyzing blended
scenarios such as carried interest, because they can be considered "similar"
to two different and opposite treatments.50  In the words of Professor
Weisbach:
It is as if we had to choose a color for three squares arranged in a
line. The square on the right is red and the square the left is blue. If
we must choose red or blue for the middle square, we cannot pick a
color by noting only that the square to the right is red, ignoring the
blue square on the left. Horizontal equity arguments fail entirely in
this context.
51
Under this analysis, the taxation of carried interest is purely an
exercise in line-drawing across a spectrum, since the law creates two
inconsistent poles at the far ends (capital gain on one and ordinary income
on the other) while a third choice (carried interest) falls in the middle.
Viewed from this perspective, proponents of the current law treatment
claim less distortions would arise from treating GPs in private equity funds
more like "sweat equity"-or the gain in the value of a business derived
48 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 11-16, 44-46.
49 See, e.g., Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46
TAx LAW. 19, 41 (1992); see also Fleischer, supra note 1, at 44-47. The usefulness of
horizontal equity as an independent norm in the tax laws has been challenged, however. See,
e.g., Weisbach, supra note 1, at 740. This does not mean that GPs always earn such
staggering returns, or that private equity funds never lose money, but rather that since such
returns are possible it is difficult to argue that the returns on carried interest are solely in the
nature of a return on invested capital, and thus horizontal equity comes into play.
50 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 718.
51 Id.
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from the work of its owners-than compensation for services.
52
In addition to the claim that the taxation of carried interest as capital
gain violates the norm of horizontal equity, proponents of reform also
contend that such taxation violates the underlying policies supporting the
distinction between ordinary income and capital gains.53  In particular, as
discussed in more detail in Section IV infra, capital gains are treated
differently than ordinary income due to two policy concerns: (1) bunching
and (2) lock-in. In general, bunching refers to the phenomenon that gains
from sale of assets accrue over time but are realized all in one year, while
lock-in refers to the concept that investors have an incentive not to sell an
asset solely to avoid tax. 4 The primary concern with bunching and lock-in
is that, as more gain accrues over time, the more tax will be paid upon a sale
of the asset and thus the worse the problems become; to address bunching
and lock-in, Congress adopted preferential rates for the taxation of capital
gains.55
A fundamental aspect of the bunching and lock-in phenomena is that
they require an upfront investment in an asset and gain derived from that
investment; in other words, the gain subject to bunching and lock-in is the
return on the initial capital investment. In the case of carried interest in a
private equity fund, however, there is nominally no upfront capital
investment by the GP. Rather, the GP is effectively earning a return
generated on the capital contributed to the fund by the LPs. Thus, one
52 Id. at 719 ("From a line drawing perspective the choice is clear: we should not change
the treatment of carried interests in private equity partnerships.").
53 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 43.
54 See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932). This is not to say that bunching and
lock-in are the only justifications for the capital gains preferences, or that they are sufficient
to normatively justify a capital gains preference, rather only that they are the beginning of
any discussion as to the purpose of the capital gain preference under current law. See JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES, 30-36 (1997)
[hereinafter JCT CAPITAL GAIN REPORT].
55 Of particular concern was that a large portion of such gain could be comprised solely
of inflationary returns, and thus not represent any increase in the ability to consume. See
Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48
TAx L. REv. 319, 337 (1993). It is arguable whether the capital gains preference is the
optimal way to fulfill this policy, or whether it does so at all. See, e.g., John W. Lee,
Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAx REv. 1 (1995);
Michael J. Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference Section I: The Problems of
Inflation, Bunching, and Lock-In, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 313 (1977). For example, indexing
basis for inflation could directly address the inflation issue. See JCT CAPITAL GAIN REPORT,
supra note 54, at 36-39. It is clear, however, that these are the stated policies for the capital
gain preference and that the rules crafted with respect to it have been justified in this manner,
regardless of their efficacy. See, e.g., John W. Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve" and the
"Farce" of Progressivity 1921-1986, 1 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 1 (2005). Thus, solely for
purposes of analyzing the issue in the context of the carried interest debate, it is sufficient to
focus on these policies.
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argument has been that the income attributable to the profits interest is
really income from services and not capital, and the GP should not be
entitled to capital gain treatment because there are no bunching or lock-in
concerns.16  Critics of this argument counter that current law permits an
identical result through borrowing funds to make an investment, and thus
this result does not violate any deep norm regarding the capital gains
preference. 
7
In addition to the normative debates over reform of the taxation of
carried interest, critics have noted that there are multiple problems with the
implementation of any reform proposal as well.58 One particularly vexing
problem is that any reform targeted solely or primarily at private equity
funds would require some change to the underlying fundamental treatment
of the allocation of income in a partnership for tax purposes. 59  For
example, one way to address carried interest would be through an analogy
to other property issued to service providers (i.e., ordinary income at the
time of grant equal to the fair market value of the property and capital gain
for any future appreciation).6° Under current law, the capital account of the
GP at the time of issuance is zero, and thus the partnership tax accounting
rules assume it is worth zero. As a result, if the "forced valuation" proposal
were adopted, the GP would be taxed on having received compensation, but
the partnership tax laws would assume that the GP would not be entitled to
any of the assets of the partnership, resulting in a mismatch that could lead
to timing, character, and amount of income distortions.61 One way to
remedy this would be for the GP to receive a capital account equal to the
amount of the income inclusion. Doing so would result in one of two
anomalies-either the capital accounts would no longer reflect the value of
the assets of the partnership, or the GP would have to "take" capital account
away from the LPs. In either case, absent exceedingly complex
56 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 44-46.
57 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 741-44.
58 E.g., Postlewaite, supra note 1; Weisbach, supra note 1; Abrams, supra note 1.
59 Abrams, supra note 1, at 9-11; Postlewaite, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5) ("Critics
examine only part of the evidence in compiling their case against the status quo.
Furthermore, they fail to integrate the full fabric of Subchapter K and the taxation of partners
and partnerships into their assessment of the area.").
60 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 52 (referring to this as the "forced valuation" method).
61 Abrams, supra note 1, at 9-11. A similar proposal to treat carried interest similar to
ISOs suffers from this same malady, since any attempt to impose a valuation on the profits
interest upon issuance requires facing the partnership accounting issue as well. See Adam
Lawton, Note, Taxing Private Equity Carried Interest Using an Incentive Stock Option
Analogy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 846 (2008). An additional proposal, to treat "human capital" as
contributed capital so as to make the capital accounts work, may address the capital account
issue but continues to confront the line-drawing issue for blended returns. See Sarah
Pendergraft, Note, From Human Capital to Capital Gains: The Puzzle of Profits Interests, 27
VA. TAx REv. 709 (2008).
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adjustments, the capital accounts would no longer reflect the economic
reality of the business arrangement, and could not be made to do so over
time.
Alternatively, rather than tax the issuance of the carried interest, the
gain allocated to the GP at the time of the sale of stock in the portfolio
company could be re-characterized as ordinary income rather than capital
gain just for the GP, thus denying preferential rates.6 3 Such an approach
would require the partnership to change the character of income based
solely on to whom the income is attributable, rather than based on the
source of the income. This is contrary to the "aggregate" or "conduit"
theory of partnerships that posits that the partnership tax rules should be
drafted so as to, as closely as possible, treat partners in a partnership as if
they owned a share of the underlying assets of the partnership.64 If the GP
owned shares of the portfolio company directly, there is no doubt that the
gain on sale would be capital gain, except in limited circumstances. 65 Thus,
the argument would have to be that something about the nature of
investment partnerships, carried interest, or both, necessarily requires a
deviation from this general theory of partnerships.66
All of these alternatives implicate difficult, if not intractable, line-
drawing problems.67 If carried interest truly is unique and needs unique
62 Abrams, supra note 1, at 9 ("without using liquidation values, the capital account
values do not work out."). This does not mean such an exercise is futile, rather just
complicated. See Michael L. Schler, Taxing Partnership Profits Income as Compensation
Income, 119 TAx NOTES 829 (2008). For anyone who has read, written, or tried to apply the
capital account maintenance provisions of a private investment fund, however, the mere
specter of increasing the complexity of their provisions would strike sufficient fear into their
hearts as to make capital accounts untenable in any meaningful way.
63 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 51 (referring to this as the "ordinary income" method).
This method was originally introduced in the context of profits interest for service partners in
Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 TAx L. REV.
69 (1992), as part of a broader set of reform proposals.
(4 WILLIS, PENNELL & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 40, 9.01[2].
65 This is true if the GP purchased the asset, including if it was acquired with borrowed
funds, and, if the GP were issued the asset as compensation for services, any gain accruing
after the date of issuance or the date of lapse of substantial risk of forfeiture. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 83(a) (2008).
66 Compare Fleischer, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing in the affirmative) with Weisbach,
supra note 1, at 754-55 (arguing in the negative). See also Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 242
("The tax advantage of carried interest must be something that switches on when carried
interest is present and switches off when it is not.") (emphasis in original). For a detailed
critique of the current reform proposals, see Postlewaite, supra note 1 (manuscript at 58-64).
This problem would not necessarily apply if fundamental overhaul of Subchapter K were
undertaken to rationalize all of these moving parts. See infra note 139.
67 Borden, supra note 1, at 35 ("The nature of partnerships make partnership
disaggregation an unattractive method for reducing the inequities caused by the current tax
treatment of profits-only partnership interests."); Weisbach, supra note 1, at 755-62.
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rules, then how should the tax law differentiate among partnerships that
should be subject to the special rule and partnerships that should be subject
to the general rule? If all profits interests were subject to the special rule
just to attack carried interest, the rule could be overbroad in its application
and impose ordinary income treatment on investments subject to bunching
and lock-in.68 Further, it might be quite easy to avoid, since there could be
relatively simple substitutes for a profits interest in a partnership to replicate
the economics but which would not be subject to the carried interest rule. 69
Any time behavior changes in response to the tax laws, not only would
there be incremental transaction costs involved but there could also be
deadweight loss resulting from changes in behavior.7 ° In this manner, any
attempt to draw a line to distinguish between carried interest, as opposed to
any other type of partnership interest, could cause more harm than good.71
Some have even argued that this is precisely why the current law treatment
of carried interest may in fact be a second-best solution in itself. 72
Problems such as these have plagued proposals to change the tax
treatment of carried interest to date. For example, under proposed § 710 of
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), allocations of carried interest to a
GP of an investment services partnership would be treated as ordinary
income notwithstanding its character in the hands of the partnership. 73 The
proposal addresses the definitional line-drawing problem by defining an
"investment services partnership interest" as one held by a person providing
investment services to the partnership with respect to stocks, bonds, real
estate, derivatives, or other similar assets.74 It then addresses the overbroad
line-drawing problem by permitting "reasonable" allocations to capital to be
treated as capital gain while treating "unreasonable" allocations as ordinary
income. 75 It also addresses the change in behavior line-drawing problem by
ignoring real loans from LPs to the GPs used to make a capital investment
in the partnership.76 Although each of these may be a reasonable approach
68 But see infra note 139 for proposals to fundamentally reform the treatment of all non
pro-rata allocations in partnerships, with the attendant changes to timing and capital account
rules as well.
69 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 759-60.
70 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 1627, 1652 (1999).
71 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 763. See also Schler, supra note 62.
72 Postlewaite, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31) ("[T]he status quo is the second best
approach to the issue. Given the administrative difficulties in disentangling in any
meaningful way the return on human capital and the return on invested capital, the current
system is the best we can do.").
73 Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong., § 1201 (2007)
[hereinafter Proposed § 710].
74 Proposed § 710,supra note 73, § 710(c)(1).
75 Proposed § 710, supra note 73, § 710(c)(2)(A).
76 Proposed § 710, supra note 73, § 710(c)(2)(D).
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to the line-drawing problems inherent in the re-characterization of carried
interest as ordinary income, the combination leads to potentially
insurmountable complexity issues.7 7 As a result, both the New York State
and American Bar Associations have issued reports with detailed lists of
problems and complications with proposed § 710, as well as a list of
possible modifications to address them. "
What can been learned from the lessons of proposed § 710 is that the
re-characterization approach requires difficult choices to be made, leading
to complex and potentially convoluted rules, because it uses the partnership
accounting rules to attempt to remedy a more fundamental underlyin
problem: the blended labor/capital return embedded in carried interest.
Since the blended return problem has plagued capital gains since its
inception, there is no reason to believe that adding the additional
complexities of the partnership accounting rules into the mix will lead to a
more rationalized or implementable solution. In fact, doing so likely only
adds to the line-drawing problems, making them incrementally more
difficult to overcome. 80
In recognition of this fundamental problem with using the partnership
accounting rules to attack what is essentially a blended labor/capital
problem, two alternative approaches have been proposed. One proposed
77 See Howard E. Abrams, A Close Look at the Carried Interest Legislation, 117 TAX
NOTES 961 (2007); see also Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform
That Did Not Happen, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 227 (2009) ("A third explanation is that the
proposed reform of carried interest taxation was a bad idea badly executed, and sometimes
bad laws fail simply because they should.").
78 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON H.R. 2384 (2007),
available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2007/071113commentshr2834.pdf; N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON PROPOSED CARRIED INTEREST AND FEE
DEFERRAL LEGISLATION (2008), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/Content
Folders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1166Rpt.pdf. These issues have served as the basis
for proposals to amend proposed § 710. See Hedge Funds and the Financial Market:
Hearing Before the H. R. Comm. on Oversight and Gov'nt Reform, 1 10th Cong. (2008)
(testimony of Joseph Bankman, Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081113102023.pdf [hereinafter
Bankman Testimony]; Gergen, supra note 20, at 149 ("Many of the problems that have been
raised.., are technical in nature and solvable.").
79 See, e.g., Postlewaite, supra note 1 (manuscript at 67):
Once a compensatory equity interest is received, the clarity of the return on human
capital begins to blur. Human capital begets invested capital, which begets
invested capital, which begets invested capital, ad infinatum. Like conjoined
twins, delineation between the two is virtually impossible, and any attempt to
disentangle them is fraught with difficult obstacles.
80 This does not mean they would be insurmountable, only that they would be marginally
more difficult. See Gergen, supra note 20.
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alternative has been to disregard the partnership altogether and look to the
underlying economic fundamentals of the deal between the GP and the
LPs.8 ' Under this theory, the use of the partnership is irrelevant to the real
underlying issue, which is the economic basis for the return to the GP.
Thus, if the underlying economic transaction involves a return on capital,
then the return should be capital gains, while if the underlying economic
transaction involves compensation for services, then the return should be
ordinary income. 82 This approach directly confronts and addresses the
incremental complexity problem of using the partnership accounting rules
to combat a blended labor/capital issue. The problem with such an
approach is that it does not assist in solving the underlying blended
labor/capital line-drawing problem, but rather directly presents it as the
crucial consideration.83 Given that the law has a difficult time enforcing a
line in true blended return situations like "sweat equity," such a solution
could prove particularly difficult when attempting to create fictional
transactions to represent the economic reality of the transaction between the
84parties.
Another proposed alternative has been for the tax laws to assume that
there is an embedded loan in the carried interest structure from the LPs to
the GP.85 This approach reflects the fact that the GP's return is generated
with respect to the capital contributed by the LP. In effect, the LPs could be
thought of as lending some of their contributed capital to the GP, secured
only by the partnership interest, and charging no interest. It is this
embedded loan construct that proponents of the current treatment of carried
interest point to as support for the contention that the GP has in fact earned
a return on invested capital.86 Since returns on borrowed capital are treated
as capital gains outside of the carried interest arena, the argument is that
81 See Borden, supra note 1; Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Unbearable Lightness
of the Carried Interest Bill, 116 TAx NOTES 15 (2007).
82 Borden, supra note 1, at 43. Discussing the issue of adopting such an approach, the
author states:
An analysis that assumes away a partnership must consider all possible outcomes
and justify the selection of any particular one. If nothing justifies the fixation on a
hired-services arrangement, an analysis that merely adopts that approach is
unsound. A better analysis would examine the economics of an arrangement and
allow the economic aspects to determine the classification.
Id.
83 Id. at 38 ("[A]fter disregarding a partnership, the analysis must consider whether the
arrangement is a hired-services arrangement or a hired-property arrangement.
Unfortunately, the law is largely unhelpful with each of those determinations.").
8 See id.
85 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 44-46.
86 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 743-44.
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treatin carried interest as capital gain is not particularly troubling in and of
itself. 8
Even assuming this is correct, if the embedded loan were a "true" non-
interest bearing loan, it would be subject to special rules requiring
imputation of interest income. Under current law, a compensation-related
interest-free loan would be subject to a deemed payment schedule, in which
it would be assumed that the LPs paid compensation to the GP, which the
GP then used to pay interest to the LPs. 8 This set of deemed transactions
would require the GP to include some amount of the value of the profits
interest as ordinary compensation income and thus could offset some of the
horizontal equity and capital gain policy problems with carried interest.
89
As a result, some have argued that even if carried interest is a return on
borrowed capital, carried interest should be subject to these same rules so as
to convert some of the return into ordinary income. 90
As has been noted in the literature, however, doing so without also
taking into account the deemed interest payment by the GP would again
result in distortions of the tax system as compared to the business
arrangement of the parties, and that itself could violate horizontal equity. 9 1
One solution proposed would be to permit the GP a deduction on deemed
interest paid to the LPs. 92 The result would be that the GP would almost
always have zero net ordinary income, which may be the correct answer but
would defeat the point of the interest accrual proposal for carried interest as
a means to further horizontal equity in the first place. 93 To impose a net tax
on the GP, therefore, a deduction would have to be denied or limited for the
deemed interest payment. 
94
Another interesting issue with the embedded loan approach is the
treatment of the LPs. Presumably, deemed interest payments to the LPs
would be taxable income, but in addition, the LPs would also have an
offsetting deduction available; thus, once again, the issue comes down to
whether the offsetting deduction can or should be disallowed in whole or in
part. 95 In reality, however, LPs of private equity funds disproportionately
tend to be tax-exempt investors (either exempt charities or pension funds or
87 Id.
88 See 26 U.S.C. § 7872 (2008).
89 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 53-54 (referring to this as the "cost of capital" approach).
" Id. at 57-58.
91 Cunningham & Engler, supra note 1, at 129.
92 id.
93 See Abrams, supra note 3, at 189.
94 See Cunningham & Engler, supra note 1, at 130-31 (discussing the limitation on
investment interest under 26 U.S.C. § 163(d) (2008)); Schmolka, supra note 39, at 311-12
(discussing the limitation on investment expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 212 (2008)).
95 See Cunningham & Engler, supra note 1, at 194 n.23.
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non-U.S. persons not subject to U.S. tax on their investments), 96 and thus
may be indifferent to the taxable income irrespective of the availability of a
deduction.
It has been claimed that this, not the capital gain treatment of carried
interest to the GP, is the real issue in carried interest, i.e., that tax-
indifferent LPs permit exploitation of tax rules. 97 The argument looks to
the tension among arm's-length parties that is typically relied upon to limit
the ability to exploit such issues in other contexts. In short, under this
argument, the GP wants the carried interest to be capital gains due to
preferential rates, while taxable LPs want the carried interest to be
compensation so that they can receive a deduction. The problem in private
equity funds is that the LPs are mostly indifferent to the compensation
deduction because they are not taxpayers; as a result, this internal discipline
on the ability of GPs to structure returns so as to generate long-term capital
gains with respect to their carried interest no longer exists. 98  This fact
alone might be sufficient to determine that private equity funds need to be
subject to a special rule separate from partnerships more generally; 99 in
particular, this would be the case for partnerships where, among other
things, this internal discipline could be sufficient to protect the fisc. "' Any
such approach would require not only rethinking the tax treatment of GPs,
but also the treatment of the LPs, to determine if any particular reform
would result in desired adversity of interest between the two. 101
96 Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 243-44.
" See id. at 244-45.
98 Id. Similarly, if taxable LPs are limited in their ability to claim the available
deductions, they might also prefer deferred capital losses over a current ordinary deduction.
See Polsky, supra note 3.
99 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 23-24.
100 If the sole problem were the presence of tax-indifferent LPs, one solution would be to
require exempt LPs to include gain from the fund as taxable income; while this might solve
the internal discipline problem, it could cause more damage (by taxing exempt
organizations) than it solves (by minimizing carried interest abuse). Further, it is not a
problem unique to carried interest per se nor would it address any of the horizontal equity
concerns addressed in the literature. See Weisbach, supra note 1, at 764 ("Distributional
concerns are important but they are not centrally related to the taxation of carried interests.
Instead, they arise because of the capital gains preference and if they are going to be
addressed, should be dealt with directly.").
101 For example, it has been argued that such an approach would not necessarily
accomplish anything other than shifting the LP base, because the resulting deduction from
ordinary income for the LPs would make it more attractive for taxable investors to invest in
private equity instead of tax exempt investors, resulting in little or no net revenue and only
nominal changes to the after-tax treatment of the fund and the GP. Michael S. Knoll, The
Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing
Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 115, 158 (2008):
[A] wealthy individual who is willing to pay a 20 percent carried interest under
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Contrast this with the income tax treatment of managers in hedge
funds. The manager in a hedge fund takes either (or both) a profits interest
in a partnership or/and a fee from a corporation. The incentive fee from the
corporation is ordinary fee income, and thus the concerns present in private
equity fund carried interest simply are not present.' 02 With respect to the
profits interest, however, the situation at first appears quite similar to that of
the private equity fund: the manager receives a profits interest and is not
subject to tax on its grant, and the manager receives an allocation of profits
from the partnership taking the character of the income at the partnership
level. 103
The similarities end there, however, because the business model of the
hedge fund differs significantly. The hedge fund engages in regular trading
activity, such as buying and selling financial or derivative assets, and
regularly hedges their investments through such means as short sales,
offsetting future contracts and delta hedging.10 4 The net result is that the
income of the hedge fund is primarily short-term capital gains (other than
certain fee income or other ordinary income generated by the fund), because
the fund rarely owns assets for the one-year period necessary to be eligible
for long-term capital gains. 10 5 Assuming this is correct, the income from
the incentive fee or carried interest allocated to the manager is comprised
primarily of these short-term capital gains, which retain their character in
the hands of the manager. 106 Since short-term capital gains do not qualify
for the preferential tax rate applicable to long-term capital gains, the
perceived problems of private equity carried interest do not apply, even
though the compensation structure on its face appears identical to private
current law would presumably be willing to pay a 26.15 percent carried interest to
that same fund manager, if payment of the carry were deductible against ordinary
income. Similarly, the general partner is as well off with a 20 percent carried
interest under current law as it would be with a 26.15 percent carried interest taxed
at ordinary income tax rates.
Similarly, to the extent the deduction was more valuable to taxable investors than tax-exempt
investors, it would have the effect of shifting the LP base to more taxable LPs or other LPs
who could utilize such a deduction. Id. See also Polsky, supra note 3, at 746-48.
102 Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-3 1. Until recently, managers of hedge funds
were able to defer such fee income and thus obtain a time-value benefit, but recent
legislation has at least partially curtailed this opportunity. See infra notes 158-59.
103 Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-27-30.
104 Id. at A-5.
1o5 This could be because the fund sells assets at a gain quickly or because it enters into
offsetting transactions which "toll" the holding period. See infra Section IV. Further, it is
possible for certain hedge funds to elect to "mark to market" in which case all returns would
be ordinary income, which would also not be eligible for preferential rates. 26 U.S.C.
§ 475(f) (2008).
106 Needham & Brause, supra note 12, at A-43.
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equity.
What lessons can be learned from the private equity/hedge fund
distinction? Primarily, that the use of profits interest in partnerships to
compensate managers is not itself fundamentally problematic. Hedge fund
managers use the equivalent of carried interest as a form of compensation,
with nearly identical legal and economic consequences, yet do not raise the
same tax concerns. Accordingly, the focus in the carried interest debate
should not be on the method of compensating the manager of a private
investment fund, but rather on the types of income being generated and
allocated by the fund to the manager. For certain proponents of reform of
the taxation of carried interest in private equity funds, the concern is not
that carried interest is different from any other profits interest (or any other
non pro-rata allocation in a partnership), but that the private equity firms
generate primarily long-term capital gains eligible for preferential rates.
For hedge funds, which generate primarily ordinary income and short-term
capital gain, these concerns are not present, since such income is not
eligible for the lower rates.
IV. FRAMING A NORMATIVE CASE FOR CARRIED INTEREST AND
HOLDING PERIOD
Any normative analysis of the taxation of carried interest must have a
starting point. The starting point for much of the carried interest literature
has been the current treatment of "sweat equity" entitled to capital gains
treatment and the current treatment of "compensation" treated as ordinary
income. 0 7  This Article will do the same, assuming that the capital
gain/ordinary income distinction and the preferential rate structure are
normative, without taking a position, in part to directly engage the existing
literature and in part to more closely structure a positive prescription within
the current law.108
Under this assumption, the line-drawing debate which has received the
bulk of attention in the recent carried interest literature is whether carried
interest should be treated as capital gain or ordinary income. Thinking of
107 See Brennan & Okamoto, supra note 4, at 35. For this reason, this Article will not
discuss the normative treatment of deferred compensation more generally, or whether carried
interest reform under current law would result in a greater or smaller tax than it would bear
under an ideal system, although reform of carried interest as part of a comprehensive reform
of deferred compensation more broadly would address other concerns such as the embedded
time value issues. See, e.g., Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of
Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REv. 571 (2007); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in
Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money, " 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
108 Of course, this also means that fundamental reform of either of these base
assumptions, such as repeal of the capital gains preference, would also require a rethinking
of the normative conclusions in this Section.
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this debate in terms of the line-drawing spectrum, 10 9 if ordinary income
were a blue box and capital gain were a red box at opposite ends of a
spectrum, carried interest would present a box in the middle, with the
current debate being over whether it should be red or blue. A second line-
drawing issue has received less attention in the debate, however: even if
carried interest is capital, should it be entitled to preferential rates? One
lesson of the disparate treatment of hedge funds and private equity funds is
that these questions, although related, are not identical, since some capital
gains-in particular, short term capital gains-are treated as capital under
the first line drawing test but denied preferential rates under the second. In
other words, rather than claim that carried interest should be red or blue, a
short-term capital gain analysis would treat carried interest as purple; that
is, capital gain, but not entitled to preferential rates.
A. Applying Holding Period to Carried Interest in a Domestic Tax Regime
As discussed above, the policy behind granting preferential rates to
long-term capital gains is to overcome the problems of bunching and lock-
in, which become exacerbated over time, but which generally do not apply
to salary or compensation income. 110 By distinguishing between different
types of income, however, taxpayers have an incentive to try to make
compensation or blended labor/investment returns appear to be capital in
nature solely to avail themselves of preferential capital gain rates (assuming
those are the only two options) even if they are not subject to bunching and
lock-in. Ultimately, this is the fundamental source of the concern over the
taxation of carried interest.
This issue is not unique to carried interest, however. The problem of
taxpayers attempting to make blended returns appear capital in nature has
plagued the Code for generations, and was presciently described by Stanley
Surrey, one of the all-time leading tax authorities," in considering the
treatment of capital gains over fifty years ago, referring to capital gains as
"the subject singly responsible for the largest amount of complexity [in the
Code]." 2 In particular, although capital gain has been in the Code since
109 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
110 JCT CAPITAL GAIN REPORT, supra note 54, at 30-36.
111 See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, Introduction, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1615, 1616 (1986)
("Stanley S. Surrey was the country's leading tax policy scholar and activist for more than
50 years.").
112 Stanley Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv.
985 (1956). More specifically, according to Surrey:
The subject singly responsible for the largest amount of complexity [in the Code]
is the treatment of capital gains and losses. And the factor in that treatment which
is accountable for the resulting complexity is the definition of capital gain and of
capital loss. The fact that our tax law is complex does not necessarily mean that it
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its modem inception, no single coherent theory of what precisely constitutes
capital gain has ever been promulgated. According to Professor Surrey:
The term "capital gain" has been used in the tax law for so long a
period of time and with such wide publicity that it has acquired a
very familiar ring. We are led to believe that it has readily
ascertainable content and as respects its comprehensibility and
application stands on no different a footing from other items of
income such as salary, interest, rent, and the like. But we must
remember that a fully developed concept of "capital gain" has not
been offered to the tax law by either the economist or the accountant,
so that its content cannot readily be supplied by reference to those
branches of discourse. 
113
As a result, it has generally come to be accepted that preferential rates
for capital gains exist not because there is some natural or inherent
distinction between capital and ordinary income, but rather to overcome
perceived inefficiencies or unfairness applicable to certain types of
investment returns that are not present in other types of income, i.e.,
bunching and lock-in. 114 Thus, any attempt to intuit whether a particular
item of income should be treated as ordinary or capital without considering
these policies proves futile.
This lesson was learned by the Supreme Court as recently as 1988 in
the case of Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner.1 5  The Court in
Arkansas Best was forced to revisit its previous holding in Corn Products
Ref Co. v. Commissioner, 116 which had held that corn futures were ordinary
assets to the extent they were related to the inventory of the business, even
if they were not explicitly defined as such in the Code. The response to
Corn Products was an explosion of whipsaw arguments confronting the
government, where taxpayers claimed assets were "ordinary" when there
were losses but "capital" when there were gains, solely to obtain favorable
is a poor law .... But if the complexity is to be kept within reasonable bounds,
we must at all times have an awareness of the factors responsible for each
particular complication and the values which that complication serves, so that the
two may constantly be compared and weighed. So viewed, the complexities
caused by the treatment of capital gains and losses far outweigh the values which it
is asserted are served by that treatment. Moreover, the present congressional
approach to the definition of capital gains and losses inevitably results in more and
more complexity, so that the difficulties can only grow worse.
Id. at 985.
113 Id. at 986.
114 See supra notes 54-55.
115 Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
116 Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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tax treatment.1 7  As a result, the Supreme Court in Arkansas Best was
forced to revisit the issue, holding that capital gain has no inherent
meaning, but rather can mean only what is explicitly defined in the Code. "
8
At least since the ruling in Arkansas Best, the law has focused on the
types of gain subject to the bunching and lock-in problems that underlie the
policy of the capital gains preference, rather than rely on some inherent
concept of capital gain. By doing so, however, it recognizes that
investments which provide returns comprised of both investment returns
and labor returns do not fit neatly into the definition of either ordinary
income or capital gains. In the words of Professor Surrey:
Congress answered in the affirmative when it commenced its
phrasing of the definition of "capital asset" to include all "property"
and then did not embark on the search for exclusions essentially
related to the causes of the increase in value. Consequently, the
additional value imparted to a taxpayer's stock through factors
within his control, such as the accumulation of corporate earnings or
his personal efforts as corporate president, was regarded in the
definition used as no different from increases in value caused by
forces beyond his control. Taxpayers were quick to perceive the
enormous range of possibilities in planning for capital gain under
such a definitional approach. Here again, the pattern of definition
was all in their favor.
Thus, rather than attempt to list every possible instance of blended returns
in the Code as a means to prevent taxpayers from obtaining the benefit of
preferential rates for blended returns, the law adopted a different approach
to maintain the capital gain preference while avoiding the concerns over
abuse by taxpayers: holding period.
117 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard & Suzanne F. Greenberg, Business Hedges After
Arkansas Best, 43 TAx L. REv. 393, 413-14 (1988) ("The application of Corn Products...
exposed the Service to essentially insoluble pragmatic whipsaws.").
118 See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 221-22:
We believe petitioner misunderstands the relevance of the Court's inquiry. A
business connection, although irrelevant to the initial determination whether an
item is a capital asset, is relevant in determining the applicability of certain of the
statutory exceptions, including the inventory exception .... We conclude that
Corn Products is properly interpreted as standing for the narrow proposition that
hedging transactions that are an integral part of a business' inventory-purchase
system fall within the inventory exclusion of § 1221.
119 Surrey, supra note 112, at 989. There are some relatively narrow, but interesting,
exceptions not directly relevant to carried interest in which Congress determined labor was
the primary source of value, specifically self-produced copyrights and artistic works (other
than self-produced musical compositions). 26 U.S.C. § § 1221 (a)(3), (b)(3) (2008).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:713 (2009)
The original debate over holding period and capital gains focused on
short-term investments deemed "speculative" in nature, which were
considered not to raise the same bunching and lock-in concerns as long-
term investments. 20  The solution adopted at the time was not to re-
characterize such investment gains as ordinary notwithstanding that they
arose from sales of property, but rather to maintain their status as capital
assets but deny the benefits of preferential rates otherwise available to such
gains. 1 In this manner, taxpayers would be required to remain invested in
the asset, subject to the risk that it might decline in value, for a period of
time before beneficial rates were available. In other words, the law
presumes that taxpayers would prefer not to "lock up" their salary or other
"pure" labor returns in risky assets for this length of time solely for tax
benefits, so that assets which are held for the duration of the holding period
can be presumed to be primarily investment in nature.
In effect, rather than solve the difficult line-drawing problems between
capital gain and ordinary income in such blended situations, the law sought
to provide disincentives to taxpayers to manipulate such returns solely for
tax purposes by imposing an aging requirement. For example, according to
legislative history revisiting this issue in 1974:
A holding period is an objective procedure for distinguishing
between short-term and long-term capital gains. The holding period
is an arbitrary and imperfect procedure that may be inaccurate in
some specific situations, but it provides an approach under which
there are significantly fewer administrative and compliance
difficulties than would arise under a less objective standard...
[I]t is argued that there should be special tax treatment for gains on
assets held for investment but not on those held for speculative
profit. The underlying concept is that a person who holds an
investment for only a short time is primarily interested in obtaining
quick gains from short-term market fluctuations which is a
distinctively speculative activity. In contrast, the person who holds
an investment for a long time probably is basically interested
fundamentally in the income aspects of his investment and in the
120 Id.
121 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (2008). More specifically, this approach was adopted in 1934 after
perceived abuses of holding period as a definitional aspect of capital gain. See Myron C.
Grauer, A Case for Congressional Facilitation of a Collaborative Model of Statutory
Interpretation in the Tax Area: Lessons to be Learned from the Corn Products and Arkansas
Best Cases and the Historical Development of the Statutory Definition of "Capital Asset(s), "
84 KY. L.J. 1, 45-46 (1995-96). This further supports the contention that holding period
was meant to remedy overbreadth in the definition of capital gains by denying preferential
rates to specific types of capital gains.
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long-term appreciation in value. 1
22
In essence, the law used holding period to distinguish returns
attributable to labor (i.e., the ability to speculatively trade) as opposed to
investment (i.e., long-term investments subject to bunching and lock-in),
even though both types of returns derived from dispositions of investments
in "capital" assets such as stocks or bonds. 123 Under this approach, if an
investor owned an asset for a fixed period of time while incurring the full
risk of the asset appreciating or depreciating, then it would be assumed the
investor held the asset for investment purposes and thus would be eligible
for preferential capital gains rates. 124 This period of time has changed over
the years, but under current law it is one year. 
125
This solution to the problem of speculation in itself does not prove
particularly helpful in resolving the carried interest issue, primarily because
private equity fund investments tend to be held for at least one year. It is
relatively easy for GPs of private equity funds to establish that the return on
investment is not speculative in nature, at least not in the same manner as
day traders or other short swing investors. As a result, the aging
requirement of the holding period rules alone does not address the blended
labor/investment returns in the carried interest context, since the type of
labor return addressed through the holding period rules (speculation) is
different than the type of labor returns at issue in private equity
(money/investment management). Contrast this with hedge funds,
however, which are primarily speculative in nature and which engage in
frequent trading of assets. In this case, the holding period rules work
remarkably well-they avoid the difficult line-drawing problem by
permitting the assets of the hedge fund to be treated as capital assets, but
deny the benefit of preferential rates because the value is generated by
trading and speculation and not from investment returns subject to bunching
and lock-in.
This does not necessarily mean that holding period is irrelevant to
private equity fund carried interest due to the second, more recent,
requirement for long-term preferential capital gains rates: that the asset be
held for the requisite holding period without the taxpayer significantly
reducing the risk of loss related to the asset. 126 Under these rules, if a
taxpayer owns an asset and then enters into any form of offsetting position
122 H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 3237-38 (1976).
123 See JCT CAPITAL GAIN REPORT, supra note 54, at 24-26.
124 Surrey, supra note 112, at 999-1003.
125 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (2008). Over recent years, the time period has fluctuated from six
months to eighteen months. See JCT CAPITAL GAIN REPORT, supra note 54, at 7-8.
126 As discussed in more detail in Section V infra, these rules are found in multiple parts
of the Code, but primarily can be found in 26 U.S.C. §§ 1092, 1233 (2008) and the
regulations promulgated thereunder.
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which protects the taxpayer from losing money with respect to that asset,
the clock for the holding period does not start or, if it had already started,
stops during such time. Thus, a taxpayer who owns a capital asset for
three months, then enters into an offsetting position such as a put option
against the asset for thirteen months, and then sells the asset in month
sixteen, would not qualify for long-term capital gain, even though the
taxpayer held the asset for longer than one year.128  These rules were
believed to be necessary in light of modem financial instruments making it
possible for a taxpayer to legally own an asset for the requisite holding
period while being fully divested or protected from part or all of the
economic risks of ownership during such time. 129
The policy behind these "tolling" rules is the converse of the policy
behind the "aging" rules-that holding period is meant to reflect ownership
of the capital asset only if it is subject to risk of loss. 130 In other words, a
capital asset owned without any risk of losing invested capital does not
implicate the same bunching and lock-in concerns as a capital asset owned
with exposure to such risk of loss. In part, these rules rely on a built-in
tension limiting the abuse of capital gains: the adverse treatment of capital
losses. 131 In particular, although capital gains receive preferential tax rates,
capital losses only reduce income subject to these same lower rates, and
thus are less valuable than other deductions which can offset higher-taxed
income. 132 Further, capital losses for the most part can only be deducted to
127 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1092(b)-2T(a) (2008).
128 An offsetting position for these purposes can include a contract to sell the asset at a
fixed price in the future or a "put" option on the asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1092(c)(2) (2008).
129 See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 145-46, reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 412, 469 (1981):
The possibility that certain transactions called spreads or straddles can defer
income and convert ordinary income and short-term capital gain into long-term
capital gain has been recognized by the investment industry for decades ....
Simple commodity tax straddles generally are used to defer tax on short-term
capital gain from one tax year to the next tax year and, in many cases, to convert
short-term capital gain realized in the first year into preferentially taxed long-term
capital gain in a later year.
130 Id. This is meant to serve as a compromise, i.e., something less than a realization
event but more than a mere diversifying investment. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, Another
Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX
REv. 1 (1996); General Counsel Memorandum 39493, 1986 WL 372974 (discussing H.R.
REP. No. 81-2319, at 54 (1950)).
131 Michael R. Powers, David M. Schizer & Martin Shubik, Market Bubbles and Wasteful
Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAx L. REv. 233, 252 (2004).
132 See Polsky, supra note 3, at 747. Of course, this is only the case if other deductions
actually can reduce higher taxed income; if such deductions were limited in their ability to
be used, a fully usable capital deduction could actually be more valuable to taxable investors.
Id.
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the extent of capital gains. 133  Taken together, capital losses are less
valuable than ordinary losses. The law relies on this tension to restrict the
ability of taxpayers to manipulate the character of income since, at the
initial time of an investment, a taxpayer would prefer capital treatment if
the investment were to increase in value but ordinary treatment if the
investment were to decline in value, without knowing at the outset which
will occur. 134 A taxpayer not bearing any risk of incurring a loss would not
be concerned about the adverse treatment of capital losses, however, and
would thus be free to structure such investments to appear capital in nature
without limitation.
This policy concern in the context of contractual reduction in the risk
of loss parallels the fundamental concern at issue in the taxation of carried
interest. The original concern over preferential capital gain rates was that
the preference should only be afforded to those investors subject to the
concerns of bunching and lock-in. Similarly, the concern over carried
interest is that the GP is effectively being compensated for providing
services, which does not suffer from bunching and lock-in, but is receiving
the benefit of long-term capital gains preferential rates. Treating such
returns as ordinary income would solve the preferential rate concern, but
would ignore the reality that the GP does have some investment exposure to
the underlying capital asset; after all, the GP only makes money if the
portfolio company increases in value. Since carried interest is blended in
this manner, an analogy to either situation proves less than satisfying. 1
35
The analogy to short-term capital gains can prove more satisfying,
however, at least within the framework of existing law. Short-term capital
gains are similar to carried interest in that they represent a blended return-
in the case of day trading, part a return on investment and part on skill in
speculation, while in the case of carried interest, part a return on investment
and part a return on money management. Further, and perhaps more
importantly, carried interest bears no risk of losing any invested capital
beyond the minimal invested capital of the GP, because economically the
GP can only share in profits (and not losses). Thus, the GP is not concerned
about the limitations on the ability to deduct capital losses arising from a
loss of invested capital. Due to this combination of factors, carried interest
appears more similar to short-term capital gains than either ordinary income
or long-term capital gains, at least under current law. The answer that
developed over time for such gains was not to re-characterize the
investment as ordinary income, but to maintain the treatment as capital gain
while at the same time denying the benefit of a preferential rate of tax.
136
133 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 165(f), 1211 (2008).
134 Powers, Schizer & Shubik, supra note 131.
135 See Weisbach, supra note 1, at 741-42.
136 There is a set of rules that serves as the primary exception to this approach: the rules
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The analogy would suggest, therefore, that the proper normative treatment
of carried interest should be similar-to continue treating the income
attributable to carried interest as capital in nature but deny the preferential
rate of tax through the use of holding period. 
37
Such a conclusion could bridge the divide in the carried interest
debate. First, fundamentally the treatment of gains from the sale of stock in
the portfolio company would remain capital gain. Thus, concerns
expressed by supporters of the current regime regarding the re-
characterization of income at the partnership level due to the nature of the
partner to whom the income would be allocated no longer apply.
38
Similarly, concerns expressed about valuation problems or capital account
shifting upon the grant of the profits interest to the GP would be addressed,
since it would be the gain and only the gain allocated to the GP that would
be included in the gross income of the GP. By removing both the
partnership accounting problems and the characterization problems, this
approach also ameliorates or avoids many of the difficult (and potentially
prohibitive) line-drawing and complexity problems identified by some
proponents of the current regime as prohibitive in reforming the taxation of
dealing with embedded time value of money in debt instruments (the "OID" rules). 26
U.S.C. §§ 1271-1275. Under these rules, a portion of what would otherwise be treated as
capital gain is converted into ordinary income based on an assumed yield to maturity. See
KEVIN M. KEYES, FEDERAL TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS & TRANSACTIONS 4.03
(2009). Similar rules apply to debt instruments purchased at a discount in the secondary
market. 26 U.S.C. § 1276 (2008). These rules primarily address time value rather than
blended labor/investment returns, and thus are not directly relevant to the analysis. Further,
to the extent returns exceed the deemed time value, they remain capital in nature. In the
carried interest literature, the most similar approach is the deemed interest or cost of capital
approach, which is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the holding period proposal. See
infra note 144 and accompanying text. In other words, just as a single debt instrument could
be subject to both the OID rules and the straddle rules, so could carried interest be subject to
time value rules, such as the conversion transaction rules, and holding period rules, such as
straddle rules. See 26 U.S.C. § 1258 (2008); KEYES, supra, 17.02[l][a]. Other re-
characterization rules are similarly focused on unrelated concerns, such as tax arbitrage, and
thus not directly relevant to carried interest. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1245 (2008).
137 As discussed in Section V infra, the mechanism to do so would be the straddle rules
of 26 U.S.C. § 1092 (2008). For a discussion of extending these rules to specific
transactions for policy reasons, see John J. Ensminger, The Broad but Porous Net of the
Straddle Rules: How Long Will the Fish Continue to Swim Through?, 18 VA. TAX REv. 709,
757 n.144 and accompanying text (1999). This is not to say that the current regime is
optimal in an ideal world, but only that to the extent refonn is intended to work within the
current tax regime the analogy to short-term capital gain can be a better fit than either
ordinary income or long-term capital gain.
138 In addition, this avoids the "endowment" concern identified in the literature, i.e., that
the tax law is hesitant to tax individuals based on their endowed abilities rather than actual
economic returns in the market. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 28-31. Under the holding
period proposal, returns on carried interest would remain capital gain, and thus treated as a
return on capital rather than an imputed return on ability or services.




Further, the holding period approach would overcome the "joint tax"
issue which has been noted in the literature as a problem with many reform
proposals. 140 Under this theory, the problem with carried interest is not that
it is taxed as capital gain but rather that GPs are arbitraging the low or zero
rates of the LPs.141 The holding period proposal addresses this, precisely
because the gain remains treated as capital gain-that is, gain from the sale
of a capital asset-and thus would not generate an incremental deduction
for the LPs. 142 In this manner, since the GP would be denied the benefit of
preferential rates but the LPs would also be denied an incremental
deduction, the joint tax is increased as compared to current law regardless
whether the LPs are tax-exempt or taxable investors.143 To the extent the
joint tax concern is solely one of net revenue raised rather than labels or
nominal rates, this result should satisfy such concerns; this reflects the
139 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 1, at 755-58; Abrams, supra note 1, at 9. This
conclusion applies to the current proposals to treat carried interest differently from other non
pro-rata partnership items. The issue could also be addressed in a more fundamental manner
by reforming the entire system for treating non pro-rata allocations for all purposes in
partnership tax, which would require rethinking not only the character rules, but also the
timing and basis rules as well as capital accounts, to achieve fundamental reform. See
Gergen, supra note 63; Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Contributions and
Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 173 (1991); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K:
Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1 (1990).
140 See Knoll, supra note 101, at 126-27; Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 241. The holding
period proposal would achieve this in much the same manner as a re-characterization
approach accompanied with a deduction disallowance, by increasing the tax rate on the GP
while limiting the benefit of an offsetting deduction to the LPs.
141 See Knoll, supra note 101.
142 For example, under current law the GP is taxed on the carried interest at a rate of
fifteen percent and the LP is not entitled to a deduction but is allocated less gain, which can
be thought of as the equivalent of a deduction at a rate of fifteen percent. If, however, the
carried interest was treated as ordinary income and generated an ordinary deduction for the
LP, the parties could simply increase the carried interest to reflect this change; although the
GP would pay twenty percent greater tax the LP would also be entitled to a twenty percent
greater deduction-the result being that both the GP and the LP would have roughly the
same after-tax return. See Knoll, supra note 101, at 158. By contrast, under the holding
period proposal the carried interest would be subject to tax at thirty five percent but there
would be no incremental deduction available for the LP (or the deduction would remain at
fifteen percent), meaning the joint tax is increased. See Polsky, supra note 3 at 747-48.
143 For taxable investors subject to limitations on their ability to claim ordinary
deductions attributable to investments, this proposal might actually be preferable to
alternatives where an ordinary deduction might be available. See Polsky, supra note 3, at
747. Regardless, by subjecting the carried interest to a higher rate of tax without changing
the treatment of the LPs, the joint tax would still be increased. This is similar to one of the
justifications for adopting § 7872, i.e., to prevent taxpayers from converting nondeductible
or limited deductibility expenses into deductible expenses. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 528 (Comm. Print 1984).
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strength of the holding period proposal--carried interest can be subject to a
higher tax rate without re-characterizing the gain or fundamentally altering
the partnership accounting rules. 
144
One potential problem with this approach is a variation of the line-
drawing problem. Once it is determined that the law should treat the GP as
receiving short-term capital gain for allocations of gain to a profits interest,
the difficulty arises in determining which types of partnerships should be
subject to this rule. Unlike the other carried interest proposals, however,
this line-drawing problem should prove easier to overcome. More
specifically, the allocation of gain to a profits interest could be treated as
short-term capital gain any time the profits interest is such that the holder
has a reduced risk of loss with respect to the underlying capital asset. Since
a pure profits interest by definition has no invested capital to lose, holding a
profits interest in a partnership in which capital was a material income-
producing factor could be thought of as owning a capital interest in the
partnership with some offsetting position reducing risk of loss. 
145
Due to these features, the short-term capital gain approach solves a
number of the problems faced in the carried interest controversy, while
avoiding a number of the problems with the current proposals being
discussed. It would answer the proponents of reform whose focus is the
marginal tax rate paid on carried interest by depriving private equity fund
managers of the preferential capital gain, while also addressing the concerns
of defenders of the current regime by maintaining the current rules
regarding partnership accounting and issuance of partnership interests for
services, as well as avoiding most of the line-drawing problems faced in a
number of the other proposals (while creating a much more manageable
144 Further, for this reason, the holding period proposal is not necessarily mutually
exclusive with the deemed interest proposal with a deduction disallowance. See
Cunningham & Engler, supra note 1, at 129-32. One concern could be that by maintaining
the capital nature of the carried interest, capital losses could be used to offset such gain-
potentially freeing up otherwise limited deductions. Of course, this is the same for all
blended returns treated as short-term capital gains, including pure speculation and day-
trading. Further, other rules are in place which could limit the potential for abuse; for
example, to the extent the straddle rules apply, such losses could not be claimed until the
offsetting gain was recognized, potentially mitigating the concern. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1092(a)(1)(A) (2008).
145 One benefit of this approach is that this line is already a familiar one in the tax laws.
See 26 U.S.C. § 736(a) (2008); Philip F. Postlewaite & Adam H. Rosenzweig, Anachronisms
in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code: Is It Time to Part with Section 736?, 100 Nw.
U. L. REv. 379 (2006). One difficulty could be if taxpayers added some risk of loss to
profits interests, such as a "deficit restoration obligation" or some form of top-tier loss
allocation, presenting another potentially difficult line-drawing problem. To the extent these
have "substantial economic effect" and thus actually change the structure of the deal and the
economic risk of the GP, it is possibly not the worst result. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text. Further, it could be possible to avoid an all-or-nothing approach even
within this context through the "identified straddle" rules. See infra note 228.
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line-drawing issue).
This does not end the analysis, since presumably private equity fund
managers would respond to any change in the tax law by restructuring their
carried interest. In fact, this is one of the primary criticisms of any proposal
to change to an ordinary income approach. 46 Presumably, the simplest
way to avoid this problem would be to structure the carried interest as a true
loan outside the partnership. In other words, the LPs would lend a portion
of their investment capital to the GP directly rather than invest the money in
the fund, and the GP would then use the money to invest in the fund on its
own behalf, with the loan being nonrecourse and secured only by the GP's
partnership interest. Such a structure would fairly closely replicate the
economics of carried interest; the difference is that, since the GP would no
longer own a profits interest but a "real" capital interest, the short-term
capital gain solution would no longer apply. 1
47
Perhaps this is not the worst result, however; providing incentives for
taxpayers to enter into economically transparent transactions for which the
tax laws have established rules may be a valuable end in itself. 148 First, the
tax law has established rules to deal with loans made between related
parties, regardless whether they bear adequate interest.149 Thus, a number
of the complexities introduced by involving the complex partnership
accounting rules would be avoided by taxpayers shifting to a "true" loan
structure. rso Second, the more transparent structure would permit Congress
to consider directly the treatment of such arrangements. In other words, if
Congress wished to increase the tax rate on loans to fund managers by their
investors, it could do so much more easilYlto "true" loans than to embedded
or hidden loans within the partnership. Third, papering an embedded
loan in the carried interest as a true loan outside the partnership could be
done in a manner so as not to distort any real economics of the transaction,
146 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 759-62.
147 Although nonrecourse loans act to limit the risk of loss with respect to an asset
purchased with the debt, and thus could be thought of in the same manner, for historic
reasons it is not treated as an offsetting position reducing risk of loss (except in limited
circumstances). See infra Section V for a discussion of the nonrecourse debt paradigm.
148 In other words, the potential deadweight loss may be outweighed by the transaction
cost savings and/or distributive benefits. See Fair and Equitable Tax Policy for America's
Working Families: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007)
(testimony of Mark P. Gergen, Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law),
available at http://waysand means.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=6433
[hereinafter Gergen Testimony]; Wolfgang Sch6n, The Odd Couple: A Common Future for
Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAx L. REv. 111, 145 (2005).
141 See 26 U.S.C. § 7872 (2008).
150 See Gergen Testimony, supra note 148; Fleischer, supra note 1, at 57-58.
151 This could include, among other things, imposing a higher implicit time value
component on the loan than the "applicable federal rate" which is currently utilized under 26
U.S.C. § 7872(e)(1) (2008). See Knoll, supra note 101.
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and thus should result in little, if any, incremental deadweight loss as
compared with the carried interest structure. 152 Rather, the incremental cost
would be purely an administrative one, making the cost/benefit analysis
favorable towards the adoption of such a proposal. 1
5 3
Lastly, the holding period proposal would bring the tax treatment of
private equity fund sponsors closer to those of hedge funds-equalizing the
tax treatment of the similar carried interest structures utilized by private
equity and hedge funds. For example, there is little if any discussion as to
why conversion proposals such as proposed § 710 should be applied to
carried interest in hedge funds when there is often no concern of abuse in
such situations (because they are not entitled to preferential rates under
current law). Rather, application of proposed § 710 to GPs of hedge funds
would appear solely to increase complexity while adding little normative
benefit to the taxation of the managers of hedge funds-at least to the
extent that rate concerns are driving the debate over the taxation of carried
interest. Excluding hedge funds from the scope of § 710 would address
this, but only by introducing yet another difficult if not impossible to
enforce line-drawing problem (as well as the corresponding incentives to
private equity to exploit the distinction). Under the holding period
proposal, GPs of both private equity and hedge funds would receive short-
term capital gain treatment on their investment-based returns, treating both
similarly for tax purposes without requiring overly complex or arbitrary
provisions.
B. Applying Holding Period to Carried Interest in an International Tax
Regime
Once it is determined that a holding period approach would be
preferable within a domestic context, it becomes useful to expand the
analysis to one in which there are multiple taxing jurisdictions and mobility
of capital to exploit differences among these jurisdictions, especially in the
context of private equity fund sponsors, which have proven to be both tax
sensitive and financially sophisticated, and which are relatively mobile as
compared to other types of businesses. 154 To this end, two alternatives
152 See Weisbach, supra note 70.
153 Further, it is possible (if not likely) that the carried interest structure itself is a
distorted structure due to the current tax laws, in which case providing incentives to engage
in a true loan structure could in fact be more efficient as a second-best solution.
154 See, e.g., Peter Yeoh, Should Private Equity Funds Be Further Regulated?, 8 J. AsSET
MGMT. 215, 224 (2007). Of course, this assumes the incidence of the holding period
proposal would fall on the GP. To the extent the incidence of the tax falls on the LPs or on
the portfolio company, the answer could differ. At first glance, however, it would appear
that if the U.S. fund could shift the incidence of the increased tax to the LPs it would mean
there was not a competition problem, since the LPs would continue to invest notwithstanding
the increased cost, while if the fund could not do so then the incidence would return to the
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present themselves for consideration: (1) the incentive for private equity
funds (including GPs) to move offshore and thus no longer be subject to
U.S. tax and (2) the competitive position of private equity funds that remain
within the United States as compared to those in other countries. From both
perspectives, the holding period approach provides a satisfying resolution,
at least within the structure of current law.
With respect to (1), once again contrasting private equity with hedge
funds can be instructive. For a number of reasons, hedge funds tend to be
organized offshore and not subject to U.S. income tax on a net basis. 55 For
U.S. funds at least, the managers of the fund do tend to be located in the
United States and subject to income tax on a net basis. As a result, long-
term capital gain would be beneficial for these managers. As discussed
above, however, the funds generally do not generate much long-term capital
gain due to the limitations of their business model, notwithstanding the tax
preferences of the managers. Consequently, the managers of these funds
have historically structured their return as an incentive fee paid by an
offshore corporation, which the manager can then defer and reinvest in the
fund-deferring tax on the income as well. 56 At first glance, if a proposal
to treat carried interest in private equity funds as short-term capital gain
were adopted, presumably private equity funds would have a similar
incentive to move offshore and structure their returns as deferred fees rather
than as carried interest. '5 7
GP, making the inquiry relevant again. I am indebted to Gregg Polsky for highlighting this
issue.
155 This is generally so that foreign and tax-exempt investors can invest without being
subject to U.S. tax. See Ordower, supra note 11, at 362-63 ("[E]xempt organizations
capture their most favorable tax position by investing in offshore hedge funds."). This is
because businesses organized as foreign entities are generally not subject to U.S. income
taxation on a net basis unless they are engaged in a "United States trade or business." See 26
U.S.C. §§ 871(a)-(b), 881(a), 882(a), 864(b)-(c) (2008). See generally JOEL D. KUNTZ &
ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION I Al.04 (2008). Hedge funds with
significant foreign or tax-exempt investors can therefore organize offshore and engage only
in investing activities in the United States that do not to rise to the level of a trade or
business, thereby avoiding subjecting the fund's returns to United States tax. See Needham
& Brause, supra note 12, at A-46, A-48-49.
156 Ordower, supra note 11, at 364-65.
157 Russell Berman, Schwarzman Declines Invite To Speak on 'Blackstone' Bill, N.Y.
SUN, July 31, 2007 (citing Robert Stewart, spokesman for The Private Equity Council as
saying "it doesn't take much more than some smart men and women and some computers to
set up a private equity firm, and clearly if the tax incentives are better overseas then that may
well be where the economic activity occurs."), available at http://www.nysun.com/business
/schwarzman-declines-invite-to-speak-on-blackstone/59458/. Similarly, fund sponsors may
have an incentive to move the fund offshore in whole or in part as a means to hold stock in
an offshore corporation, which in certain circumstances could generate capital gain upon
sale. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Hedge Fund Managers' Year-End Tax Planning,
121 TAX NOTES 1216, 1221 (2008) ("The Levin bill would be avoided and life would be
greatly simplified if the fund itself were a [foreign corporation].").
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As with the true loan scenario, this may be less troubling than it
initially appears. First, Congress has recently responded to the use of
deferred fee structures by offshore hedge funds by denying the benefit of
deferral in some of the most troubling circumstances. 1 Under these new
rules, except in limited circumstances, the deferred fee would be included in
the income of the managers in the year in which they were entitled to be
paid without a significant risk of forfeiture. 159 Thus, as with the case of the
true loan scenario, the incentive provided by the proposal may be simply for
private equity funds to engage in more transparent transactions for which
the tax law has established treatments.
Second, unlike hedge funds which act like traders in U.S. assets and
thus claim they are not subject to U.S. income tax, the business model of
private equity could make it difficult for the fund to move offshore while
avoiding sufficient control over the day-to-day business inside the United
States so as to become liable for U.S. income tax on a net basis. 160 In
general, the United States does not tax the income of non-U.S. corporations;
the primary exception being that it does impose U.S. tax on a net basis on
the income effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or
business. 161  For these purposes, however, trading in securities for the
investor's own account is granted a "safe harbor" from being considered a
trade or business. 162
Hedge funds generally contend that they meet the requirement of
trading for their own account, and thus are not engaged in a U.S. trade or
business. 163 This "trading" safe-harbor is relatively limited, however; to the
extent the offshore investor exerts any control over the day-to-day
operations of the U.S. business, including actively managing officers or
employees of the business, the investor likely would not qualify.164
Similarly, offshore investors acting as the lead negotiators or lenders on
behalf of a consortium may be considered engaged in the business of
158 See generally Bankman Testimony, supra note 78. This is not to say that the current
response to deferred compensation is optimal, but rather that to the extent Congress has
chosen to address the issue, subjecting taxpayers to the existing regime may not be the worst
consequence of carried interest reform.
159 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343 § 801, 26
U.S.C. § 457A (2008).
160 Arturo Requenez II & Timothy S. Shuman, U.S. Private Equity Funds Making Cross-
Border Investments, 842 PLI/TAx 1091 (2008).
161 26 U.S.C. §§ 88 1(a), 882(a) (2008).
112 26 U.S.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2008).
163 Richard M. Lipton & John (Jay) Soave III, U.S. Taxation of Private Equity and Hedge
Funds, SP026 ALI-ABA 623, 634-35 (2008).
164 David R. Sicular & Emma Q. Sobol, Selected Current Effectively Connected Income
Issues for Investment Funds, 56 TAX LAW, 719 (2003).
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lending in the United States. 165 Since the business model of private equity
is precisely to buy controlling stakes in companies and reorganize them to
unlock value, it would be difficult for private equity funds to meet the
"trading" safe harbor. 1
66
This does not end the analysis, however, because private equity funds
could contend that they are merely acting as passive investors in securities
and thus have no business activity within the United States. 167  To the
extent that a private equity fund wished to take such a position, it would
have to be careful not to conduct any activities within the United States
more consistent with a business than with the activities of an investor,
1 68
potentially increasing compliance and oversight costs and thus making
operation of the fund more expensive. Further, if the private equity fund
did not buy a controlling stake in a company but rather participated in a
consortium, it would be possible that the one or more other members of the
consortium could be considered to be engaged in a U.S. trade or business,
potentially subjecting the fund to U.S. tax. 69 Consequently, restructuring
as an offshore corporation could be riskier for private equity than for hedge
funds, given the absence of a regulatory safe harbor. Such uncertainty, in
addition to the increased transaction costs of maintaining non-U.S. status,
could serve as a deterrent to private equity funds to relocate offshore. 1
70
Due to the interactions of these rules, the tax law can better rely on the
tension between the interests of the GP and the interests of the LPs to limit
the ability of private equity to move offshore to escape the holding interest
proposal. The move offshore would be solely to maximize the GP's tax
treatment, while the risk would be that the entire fund would bear an entity
165 Id. at 752-53.
166 It is possible that the fund would argue that it should be treated solely as a passive
equity investor, although it could be a risky position depending on the involvement of the
fund in the day-to-day operations of the portfolio companies. Id. at 776-77. See also
Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Tax Problems of Investment Funds, 60 TAx LAW. 583
(2007).
167 There is evidence that private equity funds make such a claim currently with respect
to their non-U.S. investors. See, e.g., Polsky, supra note 3, at 746, n.32; Lee A. Sheppard,
News Analysis: Are Hedge Funds in a Trade or Business?, 114 TAX NOTES 140 (2007);
Sicular & Sobel, supra note 164, at 772-73. The difference if the entire fund moved
offshore would be that all the LPs, and not just the non-U.S. LPs, would bear the risk of tax
if the position was incorrect. For tax-exempt LPs in particular, this incremental risk could be
a substantial negative factor in deciding whether to invest in a particular fund.
168 See Blanchard, supra note 166. This could include promoting the corporation to the
market or customers or actively managing loans or financing. See Sicular & Sobel, supra
note 164, at 773-74.
169 For example, if the lead member of the consortium were considered to be acting as an
agent for the fund in conducting a business. Id. at 765.
170 See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REv. 241 (2007).
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level tax, ultimately born mostly by the LPs through reduced after-tax
returns in the fund. Presumably, LPs would not be interested in
maximizing the tax benefits of the GP at their own risk, even if such risk
was relatively small. Contrast this to the current case of carried interest,
where the LPs are indifferent for the most part to the taxation of the GP
because the only cost to them is the loss of a deduction which is mostly
irrelevant to tax-exempt LPs. Thus, even though incentives to cross borders
can be a crucially important aspect of adopting any new tax provision, the
experience with offshore hedge funds and the business model of private
equity make changes to the taxation of carried interest for private equity
funds less of a concern than would otherwise be the case.
So far, this analysis is not unique to the holding period proposal-any
increase in taxation of the GP on the carried interest would result in the
same analysis with respect to the ability of the fund to locate offshore. In
addition to these general limitations, however, there are also benefits unique
to the holding period proposal. One of the primary benefits would be that
GPs would be treated as receiving short-term capital gain with respect to
their carried interest independent of the investment profile of the fund.
Thus, so long as the GP was located in the United States, the proposal
would apply to disallow beneficial rates, regardless of the investment
profile of the fund itself.
By way of contrast, many of the other proposals (such as proposed
§ 710) require some information with respect to the fund investments
themselves, so as to identify partnerships with troubling assets and re-
characterize them as ordinary income. With respect to domestic
partnerships this is not particularly problematic because such entities are
required to file informational returns with the IRS and are subject to unified
audit procedures. 171 Information collection can prove more problematic for
offshore funds not subject to U.S. enforcement jurisdiction, 72 and forcing
disclosure of asset classes, investment returns, or other proprietary
information may be difficult if not impossible. 173  Thus, any proposal
relying on information from the fund would provide an incentive for
unscrupulous funds to locate offshore solely in the hopes of denying this
information to the IRS. 17 4  Since the holding period proposal does not
require any such information, it does not suffer from this problem and
correspondingly does not provide any additional incentive for funds to
171 See WILLIS, PENNELL & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 40, 20.02[1].
172 Id. 21.04[2].
173 This is precisely the case with respect to offshore hedge funds currently, and is the
subject of current proposed legislation. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 1265, 111 th
Cong. § 109 (2009).
174 Of course, the GP controls the fund and would be subject to U.S. law, and thus could
be the subject of enforcement proceedings instead.
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locate offshore.
This does not end the analysis, however, because in addition to
incentives for the fund to move offshore, such a proposal must also consider
incentives for the GP to move offshore as well. Unlike the first issue, this
issue is directly relevant to the holding period proposal because it is the GP
who would be subject to the higher rate of tax by denying holding period
for carried interest. 175 Once again, unique factors about the U.S. tax regime
and the business model of private equity make this less of a concern than
would first appear. In general, unlike most countries, the U.S. taxes the
worldwide income of all U.S. citizens and all U.S. residents. 76 As an
initial matter, therefore, so long as the GP is a U.S. citizen the GP would
not avoid U.S. tax simply by relocating to another country. This rule places
significant pressure on the role of citizenship; since citizenship subjects one
to U.S. tax, the tax law creates an incentive to renounce citizenship as a
means to avoid paying tax. 177  For many, the tangible and intangible
benefits of citizenship likely outweigh any marginal tax savings that could
inure from renouncing, including the right to live and work in the United
States, which could be especially important for those with family, friends,
or other close ties remaining within the United States. 178 The cost-benefit
analysis for GPs of private equity may differ from most people, if for no
other reason than the sheer size of the dollars at issue dwarfs that of most
U.S. citizens. 179 As a result, the potential of GPs expatriating to avoid an
increase in the tax liability of their carried interest must be taken seriously,
even if expatriation is not a significant concern with respect to most
taxpayers.
Again, this may not necessarily be problematic because it could simply
result in taxpayers engaging in transactions for which Congress has clearly
established rules. First, Congress recently enacted new rules intended to
discourage tax-motivated expatriation by U.S. citizens. 180  Under these
rules, the U.S. citizen must pay an "exit tax" upon expatriation by marking
all their assets to market and paying tax on any gain as if they had sold all
of their assets for the fair market value.18  This may not be much of an
175 Again, this assumes that part or all of the incidence of such tax actually falls on the
GP. See supra note 154.
176 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 155, A 1.03.
177 Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443
(2007).
178 Id. at 469-75.
179 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 5 ("In 2004, almost nine times as many Wall Street
managers earned over $100 million than did public company CEOs; many of these top
earners on Wall Street are fund managers.").
180 Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax (HEART) Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
245 (2008).
"' Id. § 301, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 877A (2008).
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issue for most U.S. citizens, but GPs in private equity could well, and likely
do, have significant holdings in appreciated assets; as a result, an exit tax
could act as a significant deterrent on expatriating solely as a means to
avoid the holding period proposal on carried interest. Further, these new
rules also impose a gift and estate tax liability on any expatriate who gifts
or bequeaths significant amounts of property back to beneficiaries in the
United States.' 8  Thus, not only would the expatriate have to sacrifice the
right to permanently live and work near their family or friends, but they
would also have to sacrifice passing on their assets to the same, at least
without incurring a significant U.S. tax which would defeat the purpose of
expatriating. Presumably, this would make expatriation a less viable option
than it might otherwise appear at first glance.
Finally, the U.S. tax rules also significantly limit the ability of
expatriates to even visit family and friends in the United States without
incurring a tax liability, because the United States defines a U.S. resident as
anyone who spends 183 days in the United States in any given year.' 83 This
is a bright-line test, and even de minimis amounts of time in the United
States count towards the 183 day limit absent a specific exception.' 14 Thus,
an expatriate would have to significantly limit their visitation back to the
United States to avoid being subject to U.S. tax on their worldwide
income. 185 Taken together, these rules impose a substantial personal and
financial toll on taxpayers who expatriate solely to avoid a marginal
increase in U.S. income taxes. 186
Due to the operation of these limitations, expatriation seems an
unlikely response to adoption of the holding period proposal. As a result, it
182 Id. § 301, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2801 (2008).
183 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b) (2008).
114 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701(b)-3(a) (2008) ("[A]n alien is considered to be present if the
individual is physically present in the United States at any time during the day. ... ). See
generally KuNTz & PERONI, supra note 155, B1.02[2][c][iii].
185 This is in addition to any other non-tax restrictions on expatriates visiting the United
States. For example, former citizens who are determined to have renounced their citizenship
solely to avoid taxes may be prohibited from returning to the United States at any time. 8
U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(10)(E) (2008) ("Any alien who is a former citizen of the United States who
officially renounces United States citizenship and who is determined by the Attorney
General to have renounced United States citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation by
the United States is inadmissible.").
186 This analysis does not take into account another complicating factor, which is that the
expatriate would also need to find another country willing to grant citizenship or permanent
residence status. For those with dual-citizenship this would be less of a problem, since the
expatriate could return to the other country of citizenship, but there is anecdotal evidence
that for those without dual citizenship finding a new home may not be as easy as it sounds, at
least for certain high profile individuals. See Sarah Lyall, Bobby Fischer, Facing Charges in
U.S., Seeks Icelandic Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FOCE I D7173BF93BA 15752COA9639C8B
63&fta=y&scp=2&sq-=fischer/o20renounce%20citizenship&st=cse.
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becomes necessary to consider whether the United States would
disadvantage its own private equity fund managers as compared to those
located in other countries if the holding period proposal were adopted. The
answer to this question requires an investigation into two areas: first, how
other countries treat carried interest, and second, the incentives to U.S.
taxpayers in light of the proposal.
With respect to the first issue, there is not an obvious single answer. A
number of similarly situated jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom,
have also proposed taxing carried interest at higher rates than under current
law. 1 87  In such a case, although the details would differ, U.S. fund
managers would not necessarily be at a competitive disadvantage to funds
in countries such as the United Kingdom. Other countries, on the other
hand, have reportedly promoted the beneficial treatment of carried interest
under their law as a means to attract fund managers. 188 As a result, it is
difficult to claim that there is any international consensus as to the
treatment of carried interest.
It is possible, if not likely, that countries with more established
financial centers would be able to impose higher taxes on carried interest
because funds would benefit from remaining in such jurisdictions even
given the tax (or in other words the location of the funds would be
sufficiently inelastic). 89 Although not certain, this would make it more
likely that other major financial centers such as the United Kingdom and
Japan could also increase the taxation of carried interest, leaving U.S. fund
managers in no worse position as compared to their primary competitors
than under current law. While U.S. fund managers may be disadvantaged
as compared to competitors in other countries, such as Swiss fund
managers, this may be less of a concern considering the lack of significant
private equity fund manager activity in these jurisdictions. 190 To the extent
this is the case, competitiveness would not be a concern; to the extent it is
not, however, the concern remains and thus the question would need to be
confronted directly.
Directly confronting this question presents the second issue: whether,
even if they were taxed more heavily than some competitors, U.S. fund
187 Peston, supra note 1. See also Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Hedge Fund
Managers' Tax Benefits Compared, 119 TAx NOTES 243 (2008).
188 See, e.g., Jean-Baptiste Brekelmans, Luxembourg's Law on Specialized Investment
Funds, 2007 WTD 115-9 (June 11, 2007); Switzerland to Clarify Hedge Fund, Private
Equity Treatment, 2008 WTD 175-20 (Sept. 5, 2008).
189 This is also referred to as "rent extraction." See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert,
The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments and
Multinational Companies, 7 FLA. TAx REv. 153 (2005).
190 This would depend on the relative costs and benefits, which was seen in the case of
funds moving to Singapore in light of adverse Japanese tax and regulatory rules. See, e.g.,
Randall Jackson, Japan Trying to Woo Back Hedge Funds, 2008 WTD 18-4 (Jan. 28, 2008).
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managers would change their behavior or have less incentive to manage or
invest in portfolio companies. Such an analysis confronts the well-known
tension between the "income effect" and "substitution effect" of the tax
laws. 191 Under the income effect, the higher taxes are the more people must
work to earn the same after-tax income, while under the substitution effect,
higher taxes provide less incentive to choose work over leisure. 192 The
literature is divided on which effect should dominate theoretically, or even
whether that can be determined. 193  Consequently, the answer turns on
whether policy makers believe that private equity fund managers would
work less in the face of the holding period proposal, at least relative to other
professions. 194 There is no direct empirical evidence on this issue, and the
evidence that exists would seem to suggest a contrary conclusion.195 As a
result, it is difficult to justify not adopting the proposal based solely on a
claim of tax induced reduction in private equity performance, although it
could be a relevant factor in structuring the details of a reform proposal as
part of the overall debate.
191 Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 63 (1996).
This assumes the incidence falls on the GP and is not shifted to the LPs. See supra note 154.
192 Weisbach, supra note 70, at 1653-54.
13 See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV.
469, 497 (2007) ("Economic theory cannot predict whether the income effect or the
substitution effect will dominate: that is an empirical question."); Martin J. McMahon, Jr.,
The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1080-84 (2004).
"' See Carried Interest Part II: S. Comm. on Fin. Hearing, 110th Cong. 2 (July 31,
2007) (testimony of Joseph Bankman, Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business,
Stanford Law School), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test
/073107testjb.pdf. Professor Bankman testified that:
In order for the current low rate to be efficient, it would have to be shown not just
that fund managers will work less if the tax is increased, but that they are relatively
more sensitive to tax than those in other occupations.., no one has presented any
evidence that this is the case.
Id.
195 See McMahon, supra note 193, at 1082-83:
Historically, over the long-term in the United States, increasing real wages have
led to shorter work weeks, longer vacations, and earlier retirement. This is
evidence that the income effect predominates over the substitution effect.
Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that high-income earners behave any
differently than anyone else, unless perhaps their labor supply is more inelastic
than that of low-income workers because of the nature of their jobs and the reasons
that they work .... In short, the empirical evidence indicates that those who
predict that lower tax rates will increase work effort have made erroneous
assumptions about human behavior.
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From this perspective, one benefit of the holding period proposal in
particular is that it focuses solely on the GP and not on the fund itself. This
is important, because the competitiveness analysis ultimately turns on the
ability of the funds to attract investors, not on the treatment of the fund
managers. Since the holding period proposal does nothing to change the
after-tax return of the fund itself or of the investors in the fund, there is no
particular reason to think that it would change the competitive position of
U.S. managed funds as compared to those managed in other jurisdictions. 1
96
Consequently, although difficult issues arise when confronting the
treatment of carried interest in an international regime, the competitiveness
of U.S. funds as compared to non-U.S. funds does not appear to be a reason
for the holding period proposal to be unattractive from a normative
standpoint within the existing income tax framework.
V. THE POSITIVE CASE FOR CARRIED INTEREST AND HOLDING
PERIOD
One major benefit of the holding period proposal to the taxation of
carried interest is that it is arguably not only the proper policy answer, but
also would be much simpler to integrate into current law. This may seem
strange at first, but after a short overview of some provisions of the Code in
other contexts, the short term capital gain approach proves much simpler to
adopt than most re-characterization proposals.
In general, income, gains, losses, and deductions realized in a
partnership are allocated to the partners in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership. 197 The Treasury regulations provide a detailed
set of rules on how to maintain capital accounts and allocate gains and
losses so as to comply with this requirement.198 Under these rules, gains
are allocated among the partners so as to make the capital accounts match
(eventually) with the economic rights of the partners if the partnership were
to liquidate. 199 Further, the character of the gain is determined at the
partnership level, and then treated in the same manner by the partner when
the gain is allocated to the partner.200 The general intent of these provisions
is to treat the partnership as an entity for purposes of calculating income,
gain, loss, and deductions but to end up in the same (or as similar as
possible) situation as if the partners had owned a share of the underlying
196 The one exception would be to the extent the fund could shift the incidence of the tax
to the LPs. As discussed above, to the extent such shifting was possible then
competitiveness should be less of a concern, while to the extent it was not then the return for
the LPs would not be affected. See supra note 154.
197 26 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2008).
198 See generally 26 C.F.R. § 1.704-1(b) (2008).
199 WILLIS, PENNELL & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 40, 10.01.
200 26 U.S.C. § 702(b) (2008).
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assets of the partnership directly.
20 1
Under § 1092, if a taxpayer enters into an offsetting position with
respect to certain capital assets, 202 among other consequences the holding
period of the asset stops running.20 3 For example, if a partnership which
owned stock in a publicly-traded company for less than one year were to
engage in an offsetting position with respect to such stock, the partnership
would toll the holding period of the stock at such time. In such case,
assuming nothing else changes, upon sale of the stock any gain would be
short-term calculated at the partnership, and thus would be short-term for
the partners to whom it was allocated. °
This straightforward example does not address the treatment of
partners who enter into offsetting positions with respect to their partnership
interests. It would appear at first glance that a partner entering into an
offsetting position with respect to the partnership interest would not be in a
straddle with respect to an asset owned by the partnership, because they are
two distinct assets.20 5 This result is contradicted by § 1092(d)(4)(C),
however, which provides that, in general, if part or all of the gain or loss
with respect to a position held by a partnership would be allocated to a
partner, then such position shall be treated as held by the partner.20 6 Under
201 See generally WILLIS, PENNELL & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 40, 10.01-04.
202 Section 1092 only applies to "personal property of a type which is actively traded."
26 U.S.C. § 1092(d)(1) (2008). It is likely that the GP's carried interest would not meet this
test since it is a private fund. The stock of the underlying portfolio company is less clear,
however. Under their business model, stock of portfolio companies owned by private equity
funds are private-that is not actually traded-until a liquidation event. However, § 1092
does not require actual trading to apply. Rather, § 1092 only requires that the stock be of a
type that is actually traded for it be personal property (emphasis added). Thus, it is possible
that portfolio company stock could meet this definition even under current law because a
common exit strategy for private equity is a public offering of the portfolio company stock.
See Michael Kosnitzky, The Uncertain Repeal of the Straddle Stock Exception, 109 TAX
NOTES 1458 (2005). Regardless, even if the portfolio company stock was not covered under
the current definition of personal property, it is relatively clear that Treasury has the
regulatory authority to include it in the definition. 26 U.S.C. § 1092(b)(1) (2008). This may
not be sufficient for real estate or other types of non-equity funds, but Congress could add
such assets to the list as well if it was considered important or necessary.
203 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1092(b)-2T(a) (2008). See generally KEYES, supra note 136,
17.03[2][a].
204 See 26 U.S.C. § 702(b) (2008).
205 26 U.S.C. § 741 (2008).
206 26 U.S.C. § 1092(d)(4)(C) (2008). The statute states:
If part or all of the gain or loss with respect to a position held by a partnership,
trust, or other entity would properly be taken into account for purposes of this
chapter by a taxpayer, then, except to the extent otherwise provided in regulations,
such position shall be treated as held by the taxpayer.
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this approach, the partner would be treated as owning a share of the
underlying asset of the partnership. For example, if a partner in partnership
ABC, which owned XYZ stock, entered into a put against XYZ stock
outside of the partnership, the partner would be considered to have entered
into offsetting positions; in this case, the put directly owned by the partner
would be considered an offsetting position against the XYZ stock deemed
owned by the partner under § 1092(d)(4).20 v
What is less clear is whether an offsetting obligation with respect to
the partnership interest can be an offsetting position with respect to the
underlying asset of the partnership, even if such asset is deemed owned by
the partner under § 1092(d)(4). This is a difficult question because, under
the entity theory of partnerships, the partnership interest is a separate and
unique asset from the underlying assets of the partnership. For example, if
a taxpayer owned two wholly unrelated assets D and E and entered into an
offsetting position with respect to E, this would not cause the taxpayer to be
considered to have entered into an offsetting position with respect to D.
Similarly, if a partner has an offsetting position with respect to the
partnership interest, this should not necessarily impact the partner's deemed
ownership of the underlying assets of the partnership. This is purely a legal
construct, however; economically, the partnership interest represents the
right to share in the underlying assets of the partnership. Thus, the
economic realities would support the argument that the taxpayer has entered
into an offsetting position with respect to the underlying asset.
Nonetheless, the legal answer remains unclear.208
Support for the affirmative answer to this question can be found by
looking to other provisions of the tax laws. For example, in Prop. Reg.
§ 1.263(g)-4(c), Ex. 6, a partner who borrows at the partner level to make
an investment with respect to a partnership asset is considered to have
entered into a straddle. 2  The example concludes that the partner should be
Id. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.246-5(c)(6) (2008).
207 An offsetting position for these purposes exists to the extent there is a substantial
diminution of the taxpayer's risk of loss with respect to personal property. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1092(c)(2)(A) (2008). Since these offsetting positions would be deemed to occur outside
the partnership, the partnership would not necessarily have to re-characterize the gain solely
for that partner or otherwise alter compliance with Subchapter K, although the mechanics
can get complicated in more complex situations. See Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity
Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REv. 571, 619-22 (1995) (providing
detailed examples).
208 See Kevin M. Keyes, Proposed Straddle and Hedging Regulations Take Steps in the
Wrong Direction, 850 PLI!TAX 1087, 1094 n.18 (2008) ("[O]ne would not think of a
partnership interest as being part of a straddle.").
209 66 Fed. Reg. 4746-01, at 4751 (2001). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.246-5(c)(6) (2008)
("Positions held by a party related to the taxpayer ... are treated as positions held by the
taxpayer if the positions are held with a view to avoiding the application of this section or
§ 1.1092(d)-2.").
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treated as entering into an offsetting position with respect to the underlying
assets of the partnership, even though the partner only reduced the risk of
loss with respect to the partnership interest. 210  Under this interpretation,
entering into an offsetting position with respect to the partnership interest
could result in a straddle with an asset owned by the partnership. What is
interesting about this analysis is that, unlike the situation where the
partnership enters into an offsetting obligation, only the partner is deemed
in a straddle, not the entire partnership.
It may be difficult to argue that an example in a regulation applying
the interest capitalization rules of § 263 could change the definition of a
211straddle under § 1092 if it otherwise did not cover this type of situation.
However, the Treasury and the IRS have consistently taken the position that
the regulations interpreting § 263 are meant to be read in concurrence with
§ 1092; in other words, it is the position of the Treasury and the IRS that a
§ 1092 straddle must exist before § 263 can apply.21 2 Under this approach,
at least in the interpretation of Treasury and the IRS, a partner entering into
an offsetting position with respect to a partnership interest can be
considered to be in a straddle with the underlying property of the
partnership.
This position is further supported by the presence of § 7701(f),
213
which provides that Treasury has the authority to enact regulations to
prevent the use of a flow-through entity such as a partnership to avoid any
provision of the Code related to diminished risk of loss. Among other
things, § 7701(f) was intended to give Treasury the authority to prevent
corporations from claiming a dividends-received deduction in certain
circumstances where the corporation owned stock through a partnership and
entered into a position limiting its risk of loss on the partnership interest.
21 4
The Tax Court has held that the failure to issue regulations under § 7701(f)
does not mean that other provisions applying similar rules cannot be applied
to taxpayers.21 5 Taken together, these support the argument that partners
who enter into an offsetting position with respect to a partnership interest
can be in a straddle with the assets of the partnership. Even if they did not,
§ 7701(f) would seem to provide clear authority to Treasury to promulgate
210 Id.
211 See, e.g., KEYES, supra note 136, 17.05 n.309.21.
212 Id. 17.05 n.309.24.
213 26 U.S.C. § 7701(f) (2008) ("The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of those provisions of this title which deal
with ... (2) diminishing risks ... through the use of related persons, pass-thru entities, or
other intermediaries.").
214 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATION
& SHAREHOLDERS 5.05 n.204 (2000).
215 Enter. Int'l, Inc. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 71 (1995).
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regulations to such effect.
216
Even taking this as true, how does it apply to carried interest? Once
again, it requires a return to the embedded loan construct of carried interest.
The typical analysis of the embedded loan is that it should be thought of as
a nonrecourse loan from the LPs to the GP to acquire a capital interest in
the partnership.2 17 Although not entirely clear, this appears to be a favored
alternative construct of carried interest because it is similar to more familiar
situations where the borrower does not bear risk of loss beyond the secured
asset-a nonrecourse loan. In particular, since the landmark holdings of
Crane2t 8 and Tufts,21 9 the fact that a taxpayer may not bear the risk of loss
when using nonrecourse debt to acquire property has been considered
irrelevant to whether the debt is considered true debt, whether the taxpayer
is considered the owner of the property, and whether the taxpayer receives
basis in such property.220 Given the overwhelming dominance of Crane
and Tufts, the paradigm in the tax law has generally been to analogize to
nonrecourse debt in situations where a borrower does not bear risk of loss
on financing, such as with the embedded loan in carried interest.221
What has been long recognized in the literature, however, is that
nonrecourse debt is economically identical to recourse debt plus a put
option on the secured property. Given the dominance of Crane and
Tufts, and the disfavor in the tax laws for deconstructing instruments into
constituent parts, the tax law has generally not treated nonrecourse debt as
separate recourse debt plus a put option, notwithstanding their economic
216 Cf 26 C.F.R. § 1.246-5(c)(6) (2008).
217 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 40; Weisbach, supra note 1, at 734.
218 Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
219 Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
220 See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1
FLA. TAx REv. 115 (1992); see also Preslar v. Comm'r, 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999).
221 See Schmolka, supra note 39. For example, borrowings by disregarded limited
liability companies (LLCs) have been analogized to nonrecourse debt of the owner of the
LLC under this theory. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Indebtedness of a Disregarded Entity, 81
TAXEs 303 (2003); see also Stephanie R. Hoffer, Give Them My Regards: A Proposal for
Applying the COD Rules to Disregarded Entities, 107 TAx NOTEs 327 (2005).
222 See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Nonrecourse Debt Revisited, Restructured and Redefined, 51
TAx L. REv. 115, 146 n.21 and accompanying text (1995). For example, assume a person
buys a $500,000 house with no money down with a $500,000 nonrecourse mortgage. If the
house drops in value to $300,000, due to the nonrecourse nature of the debt the person can
simply walk away from the house and owe nothing additional on the mortgage. If the person
acquires the same house with a $500,000 recourse loan but also buys a put on the house for
$500,000 from the same lender, if the house drops in value to $300,000 the person is
technically liable for the additional $200,000 due to the recourse nature of the loan. In
response, the person could exercise the put, sell the house to the lender for $500,000, and
fully satisfy the mortgage. Under either scenario, the person has no liability for the
mortgage beyond the risk of losing the house.
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equivalence.223 This paradigm is so strong that it has dominated the carried
interest debate. This need not be the case, however. Since the "debt" at
issue in carried interest is embedded in the profits interest of the
partnership, there is no existing legal instrument to deconstruct, and thus the
paradigm to respect nonrecourse debt need not apply. Rather, the law
should be able to construct a hypothetical set of facts to most closely match
the tax treatment of carried interest with its economic reality.224
Perhaps the better approach from this perspective would be for the
embedded loan in a carried interest to be thought of as if the GP had
borrowed money on a recourse basis from the LPs and at the same time
purchased a put on the partnership interest. Under this construct, the GP
would have invested capital in the partnership but also would be
economically protected from risk of loss on the partnership interest, which
would fit perfectly within the interpretation of § 1092 described above. Of
course, this is only a legal construct; no real debt exists, would be
constructively attributed, or would be actually or constructively bifurcated.
Rather, such an approach would merely recognize that the embedded put in
an embedded loan of the carried interest could have the economic effect of
an "offsetting position" for purposes of § 1092.225
Assuming this is correct, then a GP holding a carried interest would be
considered to have a reduced risk of loss with respect to the partnership
interest of the fund and thus to have entered into a straddle with respect to
the stock of the portfolio companies owned by the fund.226 As a result, the
GP would have to toll its holding period with respect to the stock of all
portfolio companies owned by the fund.227  Since the carried interest is
issued to the GP at the inception of the fund, the GP would be deemed in a
straddle with portfolio company stock at all times, and thus all gain
allocated to the carried interest with respect to such investments would be
223 See id.; see also STEVIE D. CONLON & VINCENT M. AQUILINO, PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES U.S. & INTERNATIONAL TAXATION B2.04[5] (2008) ("[T]he tax
law as a general matter does not bifurcate a debt instrument into its economic components.").
With respect to straddles, however, on at least one occasion the IRS has shown a willingness
to bifurcate an instrument in certain circumstances. See IRS Field Service Advice
Memorandum No. 199940007, 1999 WL 801598 (June 15, 1999).
224 David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235
(1999).
225 See, e.g., David M. Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397 (2004); David F. Levy, Towards Equal
Treatment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid
Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX
REV. 471 (1997); Jeff Strnad, Commentary: Taxing New Financial Products in a Second-
Best World: Bifurcation and Integration, 50 TAX L. REV. 545 (1995).
226 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
THE 108TH CONGRESS 485 (2005).
227 26 C.F.R. § 1.1092(b)-2T(a) (2008).
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short-term capital gain.228
Whether such an approach can or should be adopted, and if so by
either Treasury or Congress, 229 are important questions, but distinct from
the positive claim that such an approach fits more easily within the existing
tax regime than most of the current carried interest proposals being debated.
Under such a positive claim, the short-term capital gain approach would be
simpler to adopt and implement within current law than other carried
interest proposals, thereby avoiding placing the IRS in the unenviable
position of both needing to be near-omniscient in crafting rules within a
new regime and near-omnipresent in policing them going forward.
This remedy does not necessarily solve all of the problems raised by
carried interest. For example, treating carried interest as short-term capital
gain under current law would not subject the carried interest to payroll
taxes, to which wage income would be subject. 230 It is difficult to think of a
reason why conforming problems such as these would themselves provide
the basis for adopting a complex and difficult to administer approach such
as proposed § 7 10; rather, such concerns would seem to further support the
adoption of the short-term capital gain approach, but with conforming
amendments to the payroll tax rules to include such amounts in the payroll
tax base. 23' By more closely fitting the treatment of carried interest within
the existing law, such conforming changes would presumably be much
simpler to identify and implement than in the situation where a completely
228 One problem with this interpretation of current law may be that it proves too much,
i.e., if the GP owns a put against the carried interest, then potentially all gain allocated to the
GP, even amounts allocated to a real capital investment by the GP, could be subject to the
straddle rules of § 1092. Under the identified straddle rules of § 1092(a)(2), however, a
taxpayer may identify specific offsetting positions as part of a straddle and thus insulate
other positions in similar property from the straddle rules. Thus, one possibility could be for
all GPs to identify the carried interest as a straddle and thus insulate any additional capital
interest owned by the GP, including reinvested capital, from these rules. Further, since the
taxpayer is deemed to engage in the offsetting "put" as of the date of issuance, taxpayers
might claim the benefits of the "married put" rules of § 1233, which would cause the carried
interest to escape the tolling rules. 26 U.S.C. § 1233(c) (2008). It is likely that if a
transaction is a straddle under § 1092, it is not entitled to the benefits of the married put rule,
thus mitigating the risk of such an argument. See Report of the Tax Section of the New
York State Bar Association, Comments on Proposed Straddle Legislation, 87 TAX NOTES
823, 843 (2000) ("The married put rule was in effect eliminated from the code, as it relates
to actively traded property, by the straddle rules.").
229 For example, it is possible that Treasury pursuant to its existing authority under
§ 1092(b)(1) and § 7701(f) could accomplish this result solely through regulation.
230 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2008).
231 See James B. Sowell, Partners as Employees: A Proposal for Analyzing Partner
Compensation, 90 TAx NOTES 375, 391 (2001) ("Given the burgeoning use in today's
business environment of LLCs and other entities that are treated as partnerships for federal
tax purposes, it is time for Congress... to enact legislation specifically allowing partners to
be treated as employees.").
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new regime is adopted as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Much has been written recently regarding the proper tax treatment of
carried interest. The debate has tended to focus on the distinction between
capital income, on the one hand, and services income, on the other. More
specifically, the debate has focused on carried interest in private equity
funds claiming the benefit of preferential long-term capital gain rates,
which raises significant distributional issues due to the large amount of
money involved. What generally has been missing in the debate, however,
is that the tension in addressing blended investment/services income is
unique neither to private equity nor even to private investment funds more
generally, but rather has been an embedded feature of the income tax laws
since their inception.
What can be learned from the tax treatment of incentive fees for
managers of other private funds such as hedge funds is that the proper
answer to the taxation of carried interest might not be to re-characterize
otherwise capital gain as ordinary income or fundamentally reshape the
partnership tax rules, but rather to rely on the rules already in place-the
treatment of short-term capital gain-to address such concerns. Looking at
the issue of carried interest from this perspective appears to provide both a
more satisfying analogy and a more implementable policy answer, at least
within the constrictions of current law. In other words, to the extent critics
of reform proposals insist that capital gains treatment is normatively correct
so long as there is an ordinary/capital distinction in the tax law, the holding
period proposal can satisfy such concerns, while to the extent proponents of
reform insist on higher rates of tax, the holding period proposal can satisfy
their normative preferences as well. Perhaps these conclusions only support
the claim that more fundamental reform is necessary, or that the logistical
concerns of other proposals may actually be preferable to the result of the
holding period proposal. Regardless, any discussions about the taxation of
carried interest under current law not taking into account the treatment of
short-term capital gains would be incomplete. At a minimum, therefore,
treating carried interest as short-term capital gain should be part of the
debate if and when Congress and Treasury revisit this issue.
